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The objective of this report is to develop a more comprehensive understanding, 
from a policy perspective, of key drivers of labour productivity in selected OECD 
countries and their impact on enhanced productivity performance. It is hoped that the 
project will inform and strengthen future policy development in the productivity area, 
particularly as to related to ensuring appropriate and effective investments to support the 
skills development of Canadians.  
 
The report is divided into three major parts. The first part will provide a general 
review of international labour productivity and income growth rates and levels in OECD 
countries. The second section presents some general lessons from the productivity 
performance of OECD countries and international evidence of productivity drivers based 
on the OECD growth project and productivity studies by the McKinsey Global Institute. 
The third part discusses the productivity experience of six OECD countries considered of 
particular interest to Canada – the United States, Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Finland, and Sweden – and comments on possible lessons for Canada from these 
experiences.   5 





Canada’s productivity performance potentially could be improved if policy 
makers can assimilate relevant lessons from other countries in a timely and efficient 
manner. This report is intended to identify key drivers of labour productivity performance 
in selected OECD countries and suggest lessons that are relevant to Canada. It is hoped 
that this project will inform and strengthen future policy development in the productivity 
area in Canada, particularly in the area of skills development.  
 
Productivity Performance in OECD Countries 
 
  Canada experienced very strong total economy labour productivity growth 
between 1947 and 1973 at an average of 3.74 per cent per year. After 1973 this growth 
slowed to just 1.21 per cent per year on average between 1973 and 1996. Canada 
experienced a labour productivity growth acceleration after 1996 to an average annual 
rate of 2.34 per cent between 1996 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2004 labour productivity 
growth again slowed, to an average annual rate of 0.99 per cent. Over the entire 1947-
2004 period, labour productivity growth in Canada averaged 2.42 per cent per year.  
 
  Productivity and income trends in the United States provide the natural 
benchmarks against which Canadians tend to measure their own country’s performance. 
The long-run tendency is for Canada to follow the United States, with long-run growth 
rates of labour productivity being nearly identical in the two countries. Canada’s 
productivity growth between 1947 and 1973 exceeded that of the United States, and 
Canada’s level of productivity relative to the United States peaked at 91.4 per cent in 
1984. Since then Canada has steadily fallen further behind the United States, especially in 
the post-2000 period. In 2004 Canada’s level of labour productivity relative to that of the 
United States was 73.7 per cent, a level not observed since the 1950s.  
 
  Since productivity trends are ultimately determined by the production decisions of 
firms, policies which seek to increase productivity must fundamentally affect the 
incentives facing private decision makers.  
  On the basis of output per hour at purchasing power parity, the productivity 
performance of OECD countries is quite diverse. In 2004 six European countries 
exhibited higher levels of labour productivity than the United States. Canada ranked 17
th 
out of 23 OECD countries in terms of labour productivity. This is a significant decline 
from Canada’s fifth-place ranking in 1973. This development reflects differing 
productivity growth rates across OECD countries. In this report, the productivity 
experiences of six OECD countries (Australia, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, the United   6 
Kingdom, and the United States) are examined in more detail. All six of these countries 
had higher levels of labour productivity than Canada in 2004.  
In terms of productivity growth rates, the period from 1950 to 1973 saw a very 
strong performance across OECD countries. All 23 OECD countries suffered a slowdown 
in productivity growth in the 1973-1995 period relative to the 1950-1973 period. All six 
countries studied experienced more rapid growth than Canada between 1995 and 2000. 
Between the 1995-2000 and 2000-2004 periods, 14 of the 23 OECD countries 
experienced a productivity growth slowdown. Only the United States experienced a 
significant acceleration in productivity growth.  
 
General Lessons from OECD Productivity Experience 
 
  General findings about differences in the productivity experiences of OECD 
countries are drawn from the OECD growth project and various studies of the McKinsey 
Global Institute (MGI). At the macro level, the OECD identified education, innovation, 
deregulation, and investment as the basic determinants of productivity growth. It has also 
identified inflation, fiscal policy, international trade, and the financial system as policy 
and institutional determinants of growth. At the industry and firm level, the OECD 
identified market conditions, competition, and innovation and research and development 
as key policy drivers.  
 
  The primary factor identified by the MGI to explain cross-country productivity 
differences was competitive intensity. Specifically, potential factors directly conducive to 
competition were found to be a higher concentration of production in fewer larger firms, 
low international trade barriers, and fewer regulations. More indirect factors increasing 
productivity were identified as higher minimum wages, fewer collective agreements, and 
less restrictive zoning laws. The MGI also made some observations related to managerial 
innovation: managers need to be aware of best practice; human capital of managers, the 
qualifications of managers can have a significant effect on productivity; marketing, 
means greater output for a given investment in fixed capital; information and 
communications technologies (ICT) need to be applied appropriate by users, but also the 
presence of a strong ICT manufacturing industry can positively affect overall 
manufacturing productivity growth. Finally, increase the amount of capital per worker is 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for productivity improvement since productivity 
improvement is also dependent on managerial and competitive factors. Demand factors 
like the desire of consumers for better products also can affect the productivity of a firm. 
 
  Although no MGI study of Canada has yet been produced, several implications 
for Canada can be drawn from other MGI studies. Managers in the Canadian retail 
industry appear not to have adopted new processes as rapidly as their US counterparts, 
although evidence of this has not been found. Canadian service-sector firms may be less 
exposed to competition than such firms in the United States. The OECD found the 
Canadian product market to be less competitive than that of the United States and that 
Canada’s anti-trust regime may not be optimally effective.  
 
Lessons from Country-Specific Productivity Experience   7 
 
  The United States economy possesses just about all of the virtues that are 
typically associated with improving productivity growth. Factor specifically identified 
include both the productivity gains associated with producing ICT goods, and the 
productivity gains associated with using ICT. Also important is the US university system 
and its world-leading research and knowledge-commercialization capacity. Other factors 
identified as important are strong intellectual property rights, flexible labour markets, a 
large and relatively barrier-free market, and well-developed and flexible financial 
markets. Above all, intense product market competition is identified as being very 
important in promoting the diffusion of ICT.  
 
There is certainly much to learn from the U.S. experience, although several 
questions remain, first how these factors came precisely together to create the 
phenomenal productivity success since the mid 1990s, and second as to whether these 
factors could produce such productivity success if transplanted to other countries. 
 
  While much research still remains on these questions of coordination, it is 
tempting to suggest that the intense competition and strong market forces present in the 
United States have been responsible for or have at least played a facilitating role in the 
development of the many factors that have proven crucial for the U.S. productivity 
growth resurgence.  Such competition attracts the brightest talent to the country, gives a 
strong incentive to commercialize the knowledge produced by that talent, and ensures a 
large market for such successful innovations as firms adopt them as part of their 
comprehensive and ongoing efficiency improvement efforts.  However, while 
competition may have been the integral ingredient bringing all of these positive factors 
together in the United States, it is unclear whether such an ingredient exists that would 
ensure success in Canada and other countries. 
 
The Irish economic boom provides other countries with many lessons. With most 
of its economic growth taking place in the last twelve years, the economic miracle has 
two dimensions: one is a continuing rapid long-term increase in productivity; and another 
is a short-term employment improvement. The causes of this productivity growth have 
important policy implications for other countries pursuing productivity improvement.  
 
  Irish commercial, industrial, tax and education policies have been very supportive 
of rapid long-term productivity growth. This strong and consistent support is not recent, 
but began to develop in the 1950s and matured in the 1970s. The goals of these policies 
included promoting greater openness to foreign trade and investment, developing a 
business-friendly environment, and providing a highly skilled labour force. The right 
policies eventually paid off. More specifically, the continuing Irish productivity growth 
implies three main lessons related to economic policies, namely that such policies should 
be directed towards: increasing openness to international markets and promoting free 
trade and monetary integration; maintaining macroeconomic stability and fostering a 
culture supportive of enterprises; and promoting and supporting formal education and 
encouraging lifelong learning within the workforce. 
   8 
Australia experienced a resurgence of productivity growth in the 1990s. The fact 
that most other OECD countries did not share this experience suggests that domestic 
factors must have played an important role in this resurgence (Parham, 2004). According 
to the studies reviewed in this report, policy reforms that were introduced in the mid-
1980s have been major drivers and enablers of Australia’s impressive productivity 
performance.  
 
  Policy reforms in Australia have enhanced competitive pressures; opened the 
economy to trade, investment and technology; raised investment in R&D; and 
encouraged firms to become more flexible in terms of adjusting all aspects of production, 
distribution and marketing. On top of these foundations, the widespread use of ICT, 
increased labour market flexibility and strengthened national innovative capacity have 
been specific factors driving the remarkable productivity growth. 
 
 
The United Kingdom economy has lagged behind its international competitors in 
terms of real GDP per capita since 1979.  Lower labour productivity has been responsible 
for this gap.  In response to this productivity differential, successive UK governments 
have adopted policies designed to move the economy back to “premier league” status.  
These policies have included reductions in trade union power, privatization of publicly-
owned industries and introduction of share compensation plans.  Together, these reforms 
have increased the employment rate and helped narrow the productivity gap. 
 
  However, there still remain barriers to the improving United Kingdom’s 
productivity performance. These factors include: low investment in education and 
training; low rates of ICT diffusion; and the continued presence of government regulation 
in specific goods markets and land use. To lower these barriers the UK will have to 
undertake more investment in formal education and skills training, research and 
development; encourage the development of the ICT industry and the diffusion of ICT; 
and continue efforts to deregulate domestic markets.  Such measures are necessary to 
reward the entrepreneurship and encourage the technological innovation that underpin 
economic growth. 
 
At least three major lessons can be learned from the Finnish productivity 
experience. First, a vibrant high-productivity-growth ICT-producing sector does not 
necessarily diffuse robust productivity gains to non-ICT producing sectors, especially in a 
small open economy. Second, an above average performance on innovation indicators 
such as R&D does not necessarily translate into above average living standards. GDP per 
capita in Finland is still only close to the OECD country median despite its innovative 
economy. Third, robust productivity growth across all sectors requires adaptable labour 
market institutions, innovative financial markets, and a workforce well trained in science 
and technology. The availability and diffusion of best-practice technologies is a 
necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for productivity advance.  
 
  While Sweden’s productivity performance in the 1980s and 1990s is interesting in 
its own right, the lessons to be drawn for other countries are not immediately obvious,   9 
given the relatively unique characteristics of Sweden. Such characteristics include a 
single dominant industry, a high degree of income redistribution and employment 
protection even by European standards, and the polarization of the Swedish economy into 
some highly competitive sectors and other heavily protected sectors.  Nonetheless, some 
general points can be made: First, a comprehensive approach to promoting competition – 
encompassing deregulation and product market competition, the free movement of labour 
and capital, openness to trade, among other factors – is necessary for maximizing the 
potential for productivity gains. 
 
The second observation is that the reliance on a single industry or even firm for 
aggregate productivity increases can subject a country to the greater possibility of 
suffering a prolonged stagnation in labour productivity and hence living standards.  
Third,  as in Finland, the productivity-enhancing ICT revolution in Sweden is linked 
almost exclusively to ICT production rather than ICT use, and is dependent on a single 
firm.  It is therefore not yet possible to state that Sweden has entered a “new economy” 
phase of development, defined as an acceleration in labour productivity growth that is 
broadly based across industries.  This may in turn imply that the new economy-style 
productivity growth at the aggregate level experienced by Sweden in the 1990s may not 
be sustainable. Finally, in a small open economy such as Sweden or Finland, most 
technological spill-overs occur across international boundaries, and there appears to be 
very limited scope for other industries and firms to benefit from the R&D and 
productivity performance of the national leaders.  This underlines the importance of 




Four key potential lessons for Canada emerge from the report.  
 
•  Competition and productivity are closely intertwined. Sectors that have been 
opened up to market forces, both domestic and international, have generally 
registered significant productivity gains, as seen most strikingly in the United 
Kingdom. The existence of a competitive environment is an essential condition 
for productivity advance. One of the most important steps, if not the most 
important step, that governments can take to promote productivity growth is to 
ensure that markets, whether it be product markets, labour markets, or capital 
markets, are as competitive as possible.  
 
•  Human capital is the foundation of productivity advance, driving innovation. 
Countries that have focused on human capital investment, particularly in the 
higher education area, have seen a major payoff in productivity growth. The basis 
of the U.S. productivity resurgence is that country’s world class system of 
research universities, which have created the knowledge that led to the emergence 
of productivity-enhancing ICT. Ireland’s productivity success is also closely 
linked to the massive expansion of opportunities for higher education in that 
country. Thus support of the higher education sector, including both research and   10
teaching, likely represents the most effective means by which government 
resources can be used to promote productivity growth.  
 
•  R&D intensity (R&D/GDP) is crucial for innovation and productivity growth, but 
it is not the complete story. Since Canada through its R&D efforts accounts for a 
very small proportion of the world supply of innovations, the wide diffusion of 
best practice techniques in this country depends critically on the ability of 
Canadian firms to keep themselves abreast of world technological developments 
and to assimilate those developments.  As the Swedish and Finnish cases illustrate 
so well, R&D intensity in itself may be necessary for rapid productivity growth, 
but it is certainly not sufficient.  Sweden and Finland have the two highest R&D 
intensities, yet have labour productivity levels below the United States and at least 
eight other European countries. 
 
•  As a general rule, institutional rigidities impede productivity advance while 
institutional flexibility supports it. Many examples of this general principle came 
to light in the six country studies. For example, both Sweden and Finland have 
recognized that certain of the characteristics of their labour market institutions – 
such as centralized collective bargaining and limited earnings differentials 
between high and low skilled workers – can have negative implications for 
productivity growth. Both countries have shown flexibility in adapting their 
institutions to make them conducive to, or at least not inimical to, productivity.  
 
Based on the four key lessons for Canada we put forward a number of specific 
policies that could be usefully considered in the Canadian context. 
 
  In terms of the first lesson concerning the importance of market forces, some 
specific policies that could foster productivity growth in Canada are creating enhanced 
competitive environment through deregulation and gradual winding down of marketing 
boards which limit the supply of certain agricultural products such as milk.  
 
  In terms of the second lesson, the federal government has recognized the 
importance of the importance of human capital for productivity growth. Since 1997, the 
federal government has taken a number of measures to boost post-secondary education, 
including the establishment of the Canada Research Chair program and additional 
funding for the granting councils. One policy in the human capital area that could be 
pursued more vigorously are a reduction in the underemployment of the human capital of 
recent immigrants to Canada through programs that better and more quickly foster the 
integration of immigrants into the workforce. Another policy is putting a greater 
emphasis on the basic skills of the workforce. A characteristic of the workforce of a 
number of the countries studied in this report (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Ireland) was its high 
level of basic skills. 
 
The third lesson concerns the importance of the adoption of new technologies, as 
opposed to the production of new technologies through R&D. This lesson was in 
particular identified with Ireland, a country with a relatively low R&D intensity, yet very   11
rapid productivity growth. Specific policies that could be considered in this area for 
Canada include the expansion of programs that foster the adoption of best practice 
technologies and management practices by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
by providing these firms with information on the latest technological developments in 
their industry and with technical advice on how to best adopt the latest technology in 
their situation. Another area for improvement is information and communications 
technologies, which are a key driver of productivity growth. Yet Canada badly lags the 
United States in ICT investment per worker across almost all industries. Measures to 
increase ICT investment thus could boost productivity growth.  
 
The fourth lesson concerns the role of institutional rigidities in impeding 
productivity growth and the identification of these rigidities and their removal. Specific 
rigidities in Canada include the Employment Insurance (EI) program, which provides 
income support  for the unemployed in seasonal occupations, discourages to some degree 
mobility to regions where permanent employment prospects are more promising. Another 
likely source of productivity improvement is a reduction in interprovincial barriers to 
labour mobility in the professions and the trades to allow a greater role for market forces 
to influence the reallocation of workers from low productivity/low wage to high 
productivity/high wage jobs, a an important source of productivity growth. 
 
It is always difficult to gauge the relative payoffs to different economic policies. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the four key productivity drivers (human capital, 
competition, R&D and institutional flexibility) discussed, a case can be made that the 
payoff from additional investment in the area of skills development would be greater than 
that of additional investment in R&D. This is in part because Canada already has one of 
the most generous fiscal regimes for R&D in the world. In contrast, our investment in 
skills development by both the public and private sectors is relatively weak by 
international standards. From this perspective, a skills development strategy should play a 
salient role Canada’s overall productivity strategy.  
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  The main purpose of this report is to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding, from a policy perspective, of key drivers of labour productivity in selected 
OECD countries and their impact on enhanced productivity performance. It is hoped that 
the project will inform and strengthen future policy development in the productivity area, 
particularly as to related to ensuring appropriate and effective investments to support the 
skills development of Canadians. 
 
  The report is divided into three major parts. The first part will provide a general 
review of international labour productivity and income growth rates and levels in OECD 
countries. The second section presents some general lessons from the productivity 
performance of OECD countries and international evidence of productivity drivers based 
on the OECD growth project and productivity studies by the McKinsey Global Institute. 
The third part discusses the productivity experience of six OECD countries considered of 
particular interest to Canada – the United States, Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
Finland, and Sweden – and comments on possible lessons for Canada from these 
experiences. 
 
I.  Productivity Performance in OECD Countries 
 
  Productivity performance has two dimensions: productivity growth rates and 
productivity levels. Both are important and both will be discussed in the report. 
Productivity levels are the ratio of output to an input such as labour or capital. 
Productivity growth rates refer to the per cent change in productivity levels over time.
2  
 
  In discussion of international productivity performance, the issue of the 
comparability of data always arises. According to the OECD (Schreyer, 2001), 
differences in definitions of statistical categories and measurement techniques across 
countries do not result in significant differences in productivity level and growth 
estimates, at least at the aggregate or total economy level, the focus of this report. Thus 
little of the variation in productivity growth rates among countries can be attributed to 
differences in measurement techniques. Of course, there are a large number of 
measurement differences, many of them offsetting. Appendix 1, drawn from Cette 
(2005), outlines a number of these differences. 
 
A.  An Overview of Canadian Productivity Performance 
                                                  
1 This report was written by Andrew Sharpe with assistance from Sharon Qiao, Peter Harrison, Jeremy 
Smith, Jean-Francois Arsenault, and Sean Rogers. The CSLS would like to thank officials in the Labour 
Policy Branch of Human Resources and Social Development Canada, particularly Christina Caron,  for 
very useful comments on earlier versions of the report. 
2 See Sharpe (2002) for a discussion of basic concepts and definitions related to productivity.    13
 
  This section provides a brief overview of the labour productivity performance of 
the Canadian economy in the postwar period – both over time and compared to the 
United States – and puts this performance in the context of income growth over this 
period.  This section also briefly discusses the sources of labour productivity growth 
since 1981 and the possible influence of public policy on productivity.  The remaining 
sections in this part of the report explore the same themes across various groups of 
OECD countries. 
 
1)  Labour Productivity and its Relationship with Income in Canada since 1947 
 
Labour productivity growth is important because it is the key determinant of real 
income growth. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita can be exactly decomposed 
into the product of labour productivity (defined as output per hour worked at the total 
economy level), the average number of hours each employed person works, and the 
proportion of the entire population that is employed.  Likewise, the growth rate of real 
income as proxied by the GDP per capita growth rate can be approximately decomposed 
into the summation of the growth rates of these three variables. 
 
  Table 1 demonstrates this decomposition using Canadian data for the 1947-2004 
period.  Over this entire period, GDP per capita grew by 2.13 per cent per year on 
average.
3  This was driven entirely by productivity growth, at 2.42 per cent per year.  The 
employment-population ratio grew modestly over this period on an annual per cent basis, 
making a small contribution to GDP per capita growth.
4  Average hours of work, on the 
other hand, declined from 51 hours per week in 1947 to less than 35 hours per week in 
2004.  This represented a drag on GDP per capita growth: if average hours had stayed at 
their 1947 level until 2004 holding all other things constant, GDP per capita would have 
been 48 per cent higher in 2004 relative to its actual 2004 level and GDP per capita 
growth over 1947-2004 would have been 2.84 per cent per year rather than 2.13 per cent 
per year.  However, it is important to note that real income is only one aspect of well-
being, and that to the extent that individuals have actively chosen to trade fewer hours of 
work for less rapid real income growth than would have otherwise been achieved, overall 
well-being has improved. 
 
  Table 1 also breaks down the 1947-2004 period into four important sub-periods, 
each representing a different era in Canada’s productivity performance.  The 1947-1973 
period is often referred to as the golden days of capitalism, with labour productivity 
advancing at a remarkable 3.74 per cent per year.  This period also saw the greatest 
progress in terms of reducing working time, with average hours per week falling by 13.6 
                                                  
3 The tables and charts referred to in the text are found at the end of the report. 
4 The employment-population ratio can itself be decomposed into a number of variables.  In Canada for the 
1947-2004 period, the increased employment-population ratio reflected an increase in the labour force 
participation rate as well as in the ratio of the working age population (defined as those aged 15 years and 
above) to the total population.  These two favourable effects were slightly offset by a higher unemployment 
rate in 2004 relative to that in 1947.   14
or by 1.19 per cent per year.  Due to this offsetting effect of falling hours, GDP per capita 
growth, at 2.55 per cent per year, was below labour productivity growth. 
 
  After 1973, Canada entered a period of prolonged stagnation in terms of both 
productivity and income growth.  After the blistering pace of the 1946-1973 period, 
labour productivity growth slowed to just 1.21 per cent per year in 1973-1996.  Average 
hours of work continued to fall, but the employment-population ratio increased from 40.1 
per cent to 45.3 per cent or by 0.53 per cent per year.  The result is that GDP per capita 
growth was more rapid than productivity growth in this period, but at 1.49 per cent per 
year, was still much slower than in the previous period.  The causes of this productivity 
growth slowdown, which was experienced across most developed countries, have been 
debated widely.  Possible explanations range from measurement error to adjustment costs 
related to technological change to the massive supply shocks brought about by the oil 
price shocks, rapid inflation and monetary policy responses characterizing this period.  
Some of these explanations are addressed in Diewert and Fox (1999) and the references 
therein. 
 
Table 1: The Relationship Between Real Income and Productivity in 
Canada, 1947-2004 
 












  A=B*(C*52) 
*(D/100)  B  C  D 
1947  $10,586  $10.14  50.7  39.6 
1973   20,387   26.31  37.1  40.1 
1996   28,642   34.66  35.1  45.3 
2000   33,294   38.02  35.0  48.2 
2004   35,239   39.56  34.3  50.0 
compound average annual growth rates 
  A˜B+C+D  B  C  D 
1947-2004  2.13  2.42  -0.68  0.41 
1947-1973  2.55  3.74  -1.19  0.05 
1973-1996  1.49  1.21  -0.25  0.53 
1996-2000  3.83  2.34  -0.08  1.54 
2000-2004  1.43  0.99  -0.50  0.94 
* GDP per capita and labour productivity are expressed in 1997 chained dollars.  Hours 
are expressed as hours per week.  The employment-population ratio is expressed in per 
cent. 
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM series v3860085, v504324, v15900411, v29509279, 
v716818, v719846, v2461119, v21052 and v1, July 28, 2005. 
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  It is now generally accepted that Canada experienced a structural labour 
productivity growth acceleration after 1996, about one year following a similar 
acceleration in the United States.  From the 1.21 per cent average annual rate recorded in 
1973-1996, labour productivity growth rebounded to 2.34 per cent per year in 1996-2000.  
Canada’s labour market also boomed in this period, with the employment-population 
ratio increasing from 45.3 per cent to 48.2 per cent, i.e. by nearly three per centage points 
over just five years or by 1.54 per cent per year.  While average hours of work continued 
to decline slightly in this period, the labour productivity and employment-population ratio 
effects combined to push GDP per capita growth to an outstanding 3.83 per cent per year, 
more rapid even than in the golden days of the two decades immediately following World 
War II. 
 
Like the post-1973 productivity growth slowdown, the post-1995/1996 
acceleration, which appears to have been experienced only by Canada, the United States, 
Australia and a few other countries, has been widely examined.  Most research has 
typically concluded that both the production and intensive use of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) played an important role in the structural break from 
the torpid productivity growth of the post-1973 period.  The evidence for Canada is 
summarized by Wilson (2003), Macklem (2003) and Robidoux (2003). 
 
  The post-2000 period, although still in progress and consequently difficult to 
classify as a complete period, has raised a whole new set of questions for productivity 
researchers.  After the impressive performance in the second half of the 1990s, labour 
productivity growth decelerated sharply to 0.99 per cent per year in 2000-2004, slower 
than the pace recorded in 1973-1996.  Despite continued strength in the labour market, 
with the employment-population ratio increasing by 0.94 per cent per year, GDP per 
capita growth followed productivity growth, slowing to 1.43 per cent per year. 
 
This situation has proven difficult for researchers to understand, especially given 
that the United States appears to have experienced a further post-2000 productivity 
growth acceleration in addition to its post-1995 acceleration.  Rao, Sharpe and Smith 
(2005) provide a detailed examination of this issue, and while they suggest a number of 
possible explanations, are unable to fully solve the puzzle of Canada’s poor productivity 
growth since 2000.  Some tentative explanations are the following: poor productivity in 
the extractive industries due to the exploitation of marginal resources induced by high 
commodity prices; insufficient investment in the most recent technologies as embodied in 
new machinery and equipment; poor macroeconomic conditions in general, combined 
with adjustment costs to the rapidly appreciating Canadian dollar; and the collapse of the 
ICT-producing manufacturing sector early in the decade. 
 
  It is clear from the above discussion that productivity growth can vary widely 
from period to period from a diversity of effects, but also that the relationship between 
productivity growth and GDP per capita growth is variable over time as well.  In 1947-
1973, productivity growth accounted for more than 100 per cent of GDP per capita 
growth, which is explained by the offsetting effect of falling hours of work.  However, in 
1973-1996, productivity growth accounted for 81 per cent of income growth, with growth   16
in the employment-population ratio assuming a more important role than in the earlier 
period.  By 1996-2000 and 2000-2004, growth in the employment-population ratio 
became even more important, with productivity growth’s contribution to income growth 
falling to 61 per cent in the former period before rebounding slightly to 70 per cent in the 
latter period. 
 
Even at 70 per cent, productivity growth is still obviously the most important 
component of income growth, but it should also be noted that most analysts expect that 
future contributions from the employment-population ratio will be limited, especially in 
the face of the demographic crunch that many feel is looming in Canada’s and other 
developed countries’ future.  From this perspective, future growth in GDP per capita will 
continue to be intrinsically linked to improvements in productivity. 
 
2)  Productivity Trends in Canada Relative to the United States since 1947 
 
  For productivity and income trends as well as many other variables, the United 
States is the natural benchmark against which Canadians tend to measure their country’s 
performance.  Chart 1 shows business sector productivity growth rates for the 1947-2004 
period and the four sub-periods discussed above in both Canada and the United States.
5  
This chart demonstrates the long-run tendency for Canadian productivity trends to follow 
those in the United States, with productivity growth in the two countries nearly identical 
over the entire period. 
 
In the 1947-1973 period, Canada’s productivity growth, at 4.02 per cent per year, 
substantially exceeded that in the United States, at 3.22 per cent per year.  This can be 
explained by the mechanisms of catch-up and convergence that have been discovered by 
growth researchers, whereby countries or regions with below-average productivity levels 
experience rapid productivity growth as they adopt the technologies and practices that 
have already been developed by the world leaders and consequently converge towards the 
productivity levels of the leaders. 
 
Both Canada and the United States saw significant productivity growth 
slowdowns after 1973, with Canada’s more severe than that in the United States.  
However, the 1973-1996 growth rates mask a period of productivity improvement in 
                                                  
5 The business sector differs from the total economy in that the activities of government and all other 
sectors whose output is not sold in a market environment are excluded.  This decreases the extent of 
measurement error, but also decreases comparability across countries, as some activities are marketed in 
one country but are not in another (e.g. hospitals in the United States versus Canada).  Statistical agencies 
typically produce official productivity measures for the business sector only, and these are the figures that 
are most commonly quoted by analysts and in the media.  These are the figures that will be used to compare 
Canada and the United States here, and while they differ from the total economy productivity growth rates 
discussed above, it should be noted that business sector and total economy productivity typically evolve in 
a very similar way over long periods.  Indeed, the business sector, accounting for around 75 per cent of the 
total economy, largely drives total economy trends.  Business sector productivity trends were not used from 
the outset because the relationship between GDP per capita and business sector productivity is not as 
straightforward as that between GDP per capita and total economy productivity.  For more information on 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of using the business sector for monitoring productivity trends, 
see Smith (2005).   17
Canada relative to the United States between 1973 and 1984, offset by a large 
deterioration in Canada’s relative productivity position thereafter.  Chart 2 shows 
Canada’s level of labour productivity as a proportion of that in the United States over the 
entire 1947-2004 period.  This chart shows that Canada’s productivity level peaked 
relative to that in the United States in 1984 at 91.4 per cent, then fell sharply to 81.9 per 
cent in 1992.  The level then rebounded to 84.8 per cent in 1995 and fell back to 82.0 per 
cent in 1996, well below the 86.9 per cent recorded in 1973. 
 
Chart 1: Labour Productivity Growth in the Business Sector in Canada and 
the United States, 1947-2004
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Source: Statistics Canada and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, official Productivity Program estimates, CANSIM series v1409153 and 




The 2000-2004 period marks an extreme departure from the historically similar 
productivity experiences over the long term in Canada and the United States, with 
productivity growth of 3.78 per cent per year in the United States dwarfing the meager 
0.92 per cent per year growth in Canada (Chart 1).  On the other hand, in the context of 
the post-1984 period, the post-2000 fall-off in Canadian productivity growth continues a 
well-established trend of a deteriorating productivity level versus the United States, with 
the 1996-2000 period the only notable respite (Chart 2).  In 2004, Canada’s business 
sector labour productivity level stood at 73.7 per cent of the U.S. level, a figure not 
recorded since the early 1950s.  This turns the concepts of catch-up and convergence on 
their heads, and no convincing explanations for this situation have yet been found. 
 
3)  The Sources of Labour Productivity Growth in Canada since 1981 
 
Rao, Sharpe and Smith (2005) look at the industry, provincial and production 
function sources of labour productivity growth in Canada in the late 1990s and in the 
post-2000 period.  Their growth accounting decomposition can be extended here for the   18
entire 1981-2004 period for which data are available, as shown in Table 2.  Such growth 
accounting decompositions must assume a mathematical expression of a production 
function that describes how the factors of production are combined to produce output.  
Briefly, the production function underlying the data in Table 2 assumes that business 
sector output as measured by value added is a function of capital services, labour services 
and Multifactor Productivity (MFP, also called Total Factor Productivity of TFP).
6  In 
this framework, labour productivity growth is likewise a function of growth in capital 
services per hour worked, growth in a labour quality measure that captures changes in the 
composition of the workforce, and MFP growth. 
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Source: CSLS Income and Productivity Database, available at www.csls.ca/data.asp, based on official Productivity Program data from Statistics Canada and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics current as of June 14, 2005 as well as on a benchmark level estimate of 82 per cent in 1999 by Rao, Tang and Wang (2004).  
 
For the overall 1981-2004 period, labour productivity growth was 1.44 per cent 
per year.  Of this, growth in capital services per hour contributed 0.66 per centage points 
or 45.9 per cent.  This contribution from capital services per hour can be divided into its 
                                                  
6 Capital services refers to the productive stock of capital goods, that is the accumulation of past 
investments corrected for the retirement of older assets and for the decline in the productive efficiency of 
assets over time.  This is distinct from the concept of the net capital stock, which measures the present 
market value of past investments.  For example, the value of a building is not what is important to the 
output of the firm that owns or rents that building, but it is rather the role of the building in providing 
shelter and office space that is important.  Estimates of capital services in this case attempt to measure the 
shelter and space services afforded by the building.  In a similar sense, labour services is not simply the 
sum of hours worked, but is rather an aggregation of the skills and other characteristics of the workers who 
are working those hours.  MFP refers to the overall efficiency with which capital services and labour 
services are combined in production.  Since it is calculated residually, it is influenced by any factor 
affecting production other than capital services and labour services; but MFP growth is sometimes 
interpreted as a measure of technological progress.   19
information technology component (around 0.49 per centage points) and its non-
information technology component (around 0.25 per centage points).
7  The remaining 
portion of labour productivity growth was accounted for by MFP growth (29.9 per cent) 
and labour quality growth (25.4 per cent). 
 
Table 2: Sources of Growth in the Canadian Business Sector
1981-2004 1981-1989 1989-2000 1989-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004
Growth Rates (compound average annual rates, per cent per year)
Output 3.01 3.32 3.02 1.47 5.78 2.38
   Hours Worked 1.55 1.83 1.38 0.49 2.95 1.43
      Hours Worked of University-Educated Workers 5.05 5.78 5.05 4.57 5.89 3.61
      Hours Worked of Non-University-Educated Workers 1.07 1.44 0.82 -0.09 2.42 1.01
   Capital Services 3.15 3.84 3.35 2.58 4.71 1.27
      Information Technology Capital Services 17.31 22.11 18.81 17.64 20.87 4.57
      Non-Information Technology Capital Services 2.21 2.94 2.16 1.55 3.24 0.88
   Labour Productivity 1.44 1.45 1.62 0.98 2.76 0.93
   Capital Services per Hour 1.58 1.97 1.95 2.08 1.72 -0.17
      Information Technology Capital Services per Hour 15.53 19.92 17.19 17.06 17.41 3.09
      Non-Information Technology Capital Services per Hour 0.65 1.09 0.77 1.05 0.28 -0.54
Absolute Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (percentage points)
   Labour Productivity 1.44 1.45 1.62 0.98 2.76 0.93
      Contribution from Capital Deepening 0.66 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.72 -0.07
         Information Technology 0.49 0.50 0.61 0.56 0.70 0.15
         Non-Information Technology 0.25 0.42 0.30 0.41 0.10 -0.23
      Multifactor Productivity Including Effects of Labour Quality 0.80 0.63 0.84 0.15 2.07 1.01
         Contribution of Labour Quality 0.37 0.54 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.22
         Multifactor Productivity Net of Labour Quality 0.43 0.09 0.55 -0.17 1.82 0.79
Relative Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (per cent)
   Labour Productivity 100 100 100 100 100 100
      Contribution from Capital Deepening 45.9 57.5 49.7 87.2 26.3 -7.9
         Information Technology 33.9 34.1 37.6 57.3 25.3 15.7
         Non-Information Technology 17.3 29.0 18.3 41.8 3.6 -24.3
      Multifactor Productivity Including Effects of Labour Quality 55.3 43.2 52.0 15.0 75.2 109.0
         Contribution of Labour Quality 25.4 37.1 18.1 32.7 9.1 23.9
         Multifactor Productivity Net of Labour Quality 29.9 6.1 33.9 -17.7 66.1 85.1
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Productivity Accounts, CANSIM Tables 383-0016 and -0018, July 15, 2005.
For illustrative purposes, the “Multifactor Productivity Including Effects of Labour Quality” growth rates
have been calculated as the sum of the labour quality growth rates and the growth rates of the official
multifactor productivity series (which is net of labour quality).
Contributions do not sum exactly due to the use of geometric average annual growth rates.  
 
                                                  
7 The growth in capital services per hour worked over 1981-2004 was 1.58 per cent per year (15.53 per cent 
per year for information technology capital services per hour and 0.65 per cent per year for non-information 
technology capital services per year).  The contribution to labour productivity growth of capital services per 
hour worked is defined as the growth rate of capital services per hour worked multiplied by the share of 
capital income in total income (around 45 per cent).  The contributions of the two types of capital services 
are defined as the growth rate of the specific type of capital services per hour multiplied by the capital 
income share and the share of the user costs associated with that type of capital services in total user costs 
of capital.  Contributions do not sum exactly due to rounding and the use of compound (geometric) average 
annual growth rates.   20
The most important message from Table 2 is that the contribution of MFP growth 
to labour productivity growth has risen dramatically since the 1980s and early 1990s.  In 
1981-1989 the contribution of MFP growth to labour productivity growth was just 6.1 per 
cent, and in 1989-1996 MFP actually fell, making a negative contribution to the weak 
labour productivity growth of 0.98 per cent per year.  However, in 1996-2000, MFP 
growth accounted for two thirds of Canada’s remarkably strong labour productivity 
growth.  In contrast to the large labour productivity growth deceleration after 2000, MFP 
growth experienced a less extreme deceleration, and accounted for 85.1 per cent of labour 
productivity growth in 2000-2004.  This may suggest that innovation and technological 
advance, which appear to largely drive MFP, will be the most important elements in 
ensuring rapid future labour productivity and hence income growth in Canada in general 
and in improving Canada’s currently dismal labour productivity growth specifically.  
Since such innovation is usually linked to the adoption of physical capital embodying the 
newest technologies, it is worth noting that information technology capital services per 
hour growth decelerated from 20.87 per cent per year in 1996-2000 to just 3.09 per cent 
per year in 2000-2004. 
 
4)  The Relationship Between Policy and Productivity in Canada 
 
  Given the productivity trends over the past half century and more discussed 
above, one could conceivably take a detailed look at the evolution of specific government 
policies over the same period and attempt to relate policy to productivity.  Such an 
approach is well beyond the scope of this report.  However, some work in this general 
direction can be reviewed briefly. 
 
  An important general tenet to remember when discussing policy’s effects on 
productivity is that productivity trends are ultimately determined by the production 
decisions of firms, and that productivity is therefore largely the prerogative of the private 
sector.  Higher productivity is often congruent with the profit objectives of firms, but 
when this is not the case and companies are free to pursue profits or other objectives 
within the prevailing legal framework, government calls for higher productivity or more 
rapid productivity growth are likely to be utterly ineffective if not accompanied by well-
designed policies that fundamentally affect the incentives facing private decision makers. 
 
  One branch of the productivity literature that has focused on policy effects is the 
set of case studies undertaken by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI).  These studies 
have been reviewed by Kellison (2004), and are also discussed in the next part of this 
report.  They mainly discuss policy in terms of the impediments it can impose on 
productivity by creating barriers to competition among firms.  For example, zoning 
policy was found by MGI to be responsible for part of the difference between U.S. and 
European productivity performance.  The ultimate conclusion of much of MGI’s research 
is that in a highly competitive atmosphere, firms are forced to innovate and continually 
improve productivity in order to survive.  From this perspective, the most effective policy 
to ensure high productivity and rapid productivity growth is to avoid burdening firms 
with competition-diminishing regulations.  Governments and central banks should 
generally limit their interests in the area of productivity to providing a level and barrier-  21
free playing field.  Broadly, this could be characterized, among many other things, by low 
and stable inflation and interest rates, clear and simple regulations governing corporate 
behaviour, and the absence of specific tax measures or subsidies that benefit one industry 
or group of firms to the exclusion of others. 
 
  For Canada specifically, the linkages between productivity and policy have 
perhaps been most comprehensively addressed by the volume Productivity Issues in 
Canada edited by Someshwar Rao and Andrew Sharpe (2002).  Contributions that may 
especially be of interest include those by Harris (2002a and 2002b), Bernstein (2002), 
and Hirshhorn, Nadeau and Rao (2002).  Another general reference on this topic is The 
Review of Economic Performance and Social Progress 2002: Towards a Social 
Understanding of Productivity edited by Andrew Sharpe, France St-Hilaire and Keith 
Banting (2002).  In addition, some recent contributions to the International Productivity 
Monitor, produced by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards, address this topic, 
notably Nicholson (2003), Baily (2003) in his review of OECD (2003), Howitt (2004), 
and Pilat (2005).  Finally, Coulombe and Tremblay (2001), Coulombe (2003) and 
Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2004) have investigated the relationship between 
education/literacy and growth and suggest that Canadian policy may have affected this 
relationship in the past across Canadian regions.  Given the volume of this research, the 
numerous perspectives and the sometimes conflicting findings, a review of all of this 
material is avoided here, and the references left for the interested reader to explore. 
 
B.  Labour Productivity Levels in OECD Countries 
 
Table 3 presents estimates in index form (United States=100) of levels of total 
economy output per hour, based on purchasing power parities, for 23 OECD countries for 
1950, 1973, 1995, 2000, and 2004. The source of these estimates is the total economy 
database maintained by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre at the University 
of Groningen in the Netherlands.   
 
  In 2004, Norway had the highest level of output per hour in the OECD at 128.9 
per cent of the U.S. level, followed by Luxembourg (121.3 per cent), France (115.6 per 
cent) Belgium (110.1 per cent), Ireland (108.1 per cent), the Netherlands (102.5 per cent), 
and the United States (100.0 per cent). Thus six European countries had higher labour 
productivity levels than the United States despite the very strong U.S. productivity 
growth of the last decade. Indeed, in 1995, eight European countries had higher output 
per hour levels than the United States (Germany, Italy, and Denmark in addition to the 
six countries listed above minus Ireland). 
 
Cette (2005) argues that these high labour productivity levels in a number of 
European countries relative to the United States reflect the influence of two factors. First, 
the low employment rate in Europe keeps low productivity youth and older workers out 
of the workforce, boosting labour productivity through a composition effect. Second, 
lower annual hours worked in Europe promote high levels of productivity as workers are 
less tired on the job and hence more productive. He makes a correction for these two 
factors to estimate what he calls the structural hourly productivity level and finds that for   22




Table 3: Output per Hour Levels and Growth Rates in Selected 
OECD Countries, 1950-2004 
1950 1973 1995 2000 2004 1950-1973 1973-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004 1973-2004
Australia 74.9 77.1 82.5 83.2 80.8 2.68 1.55 2.29 2.19 1.75
Austria 37.3 78.4 99.0 103.8 97.7 5.91 2.32 3.09 1.40 2.32
Belgium 54.2 88.4 117.0 121.0 110.1 4.75 2.54 2.82 0.54 2.33
Canada 81.1 89.0 85.3 83.1 79.0 2.96 1.05 1.57 1.66 1.21
Denmark 63.9 76.3 100.6 100.5 94.7 3.35 2.52 2.09 1.44 2.31
Finland 39.6 66.1 88.7 93.0 91.9 4.86 2.60 3.11 2.64 2.69
France 49.3 86.9 119.7 121.5 115.6 5.11 2.73 2.43 1.65 2.54
All Germany 102.9 103.9 97.0 2.32 1.18 2.51
West Germany 39.7 84.7 116.2 5.99 2.71
Greece 24.2 56.7 62.4 63.6 63.1 6.41 1.69 2.50 2.73 1.95
Ireland 31.4 48.0 86.1 102.7 108.1 4.47 3.96 5.80 4.26 4.29
Italy 45.8 81.2 106.4 101.6 89.0 5.14 2.49 1.18 -0.41 1.90
Japan 19.7 55.4 76.1 76.8 75.1 7.27 2.71 2.30 2.39 2.60
Luxembourg 80.2 103.0 133.3 136.9 121.3 3.67 2.43 2.67 -0.13 2.14
Netherlands 69.3 103.7 120.7 112.1 102.5 4.36 1.94 0.63 0.66 1.56
New Zealand* 94.6 87.1 68.6 66.7 62.5 2.18 0.15 1.55 1.30 0.52
Norway 58.1 82.6 130.2 130.7 128.9 4.13 3.36 2.20 2.58 3.07
Portugal 18.7 46.8 55.9 56.6 51.7 6.71 2.05 2.41 0.61 1.92
South Korea** 10.7 16.1 35.3 38.1 39.6 6.68 4.92 3.71 3.96 4.60
Spain 24.8 52.2 92.0 81.5 72.6 5.92 3.88 -0.30 -0.01 2.69
Sweden 59.8 84.9 89.1 89.7 88.5 4.12 1.47 2.26 2.57 1.74
Switzerland 87.1 106.2 95.0 93.3 86.7 3.43 0.73 1.74 1.07 0.94
United Kindom 67.9 72.7 92.6 92.3 88.9 2.85 2.36 2.05 1.99 2.26
United States 100 100 100 100 100 2.55 1.24 2.12 2.94 1.60
Unweighted Average*** 51.5 74.7 92.7 93.3 88.4 4.59 2.32 2.29 1.70 2.24
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, January 2005, http://www.ggdc.net.
* Data for New Zealand are available for 1956 onwards only.  The relative level shown for 1950 is actually for 1959, the first year for which
data are available for both New Zealand and the United States.  The growth rate shown for the 1950-1973 period is actually for 1956-1973.
** Data for South Korea are available for 1963 onwards only.  The relative level shown for 1950 is actually for 1963, the first year for which
data are available for both South Korea and the United States.  The growth rate shown for the 1950-1973 period is actually for 1963-1973.
*** The average excludes the United States for relative levels but includes the United States for growth rates.  For 1950 and 1973 and the 
1950-1973 and 1973-1995 periods, West Germany is included and All Germany is not included.  For 1995, 2000 and 2004 and the
1995-2000, 2000-2004 and 1973-2004 periods, All Germany is included and West Germany is not included.  The 1973-2004 growth
rate for All Germany is a weighted geometric average of the 1973-1989 growth rate for West Germany and the 1989-2004 growth rate
for All Germany.  (The All Germany data series is available for 1989-2004 only, while that for West Germany is available for 1950-1997 only.)
(United States=100) (compound average annual growth rates)
 
 
In 2004, Canada ranked a dismal 17
th out of 23 OECD countries in terms of its 
level of labour productivity. Output per hour worked in Canada was only 79.0 per cent of 
that of the United States,
8 with only three southern European countries (Portugal, Spain 
                                                  
8 Estimates of Canada’s total economy labour productivity level relative to that of the United States from 
some other sources, e.g. Baldwin et al. (2005) and Sharpe (2003), are much higher than the 79 per cent 
from the Groningen data.  There are several reasons for this difference, including adjustments made to the 
output data, different labour input sources, and different estimates of purchasing power parity.  
Unfortunately it is not possible to make comparisons across other countries on the same basis as the 
Canada-U.S. comparisons from these other sources are made, as the necessary data are not available; but 
the Groningen data set is one of the most comparable available in terms of comparing labour productivity 
across a large number of countries.  Also note that the labour productivity levels discussed here are for the   23
and Greece), two Asian countries (Japan and South Korea) and New Zealand reporting a 
lower level. In contrast, in 1950 Canada had the fourth highest labour productivity level 
among OECD countries, behind only the United States, New Zealand, and Switzerland. 
Even by 1973 we still ranked fifth. These developments reflect relative productivity 
growth rates.  
   
Table 4: Observed and “Structural” Hourly Productivity in 2002 
Country  Observed Hourly Productivity 
 
As a per cent of the U.S. figure 
Effect (as a per 
cent) of the Gap 




As a per cent of the U.S. figure 
































Australia  83.2  na  78.4  -0.5  2.0  81.7  na  76.9 
Austria  101.7  87.4  88.3  5.2  2.5  94.0  79.7  80.6 
Belgium  113.7  108.1  108.3  5.7  7.5  100.4  94.9  95.1 
Canada  82.9  87.9  85.2  1.4  -0.4  81.8  86.9  84.1 
Denmark  98.5  89.4  93.5  8.1  -3.3  93.6  84.5  88.7 
Finland  91.7  83.3  81.9  2.4  0.0  89.4  80.9  79.5 
France  119.8  106.0  113.2  8.2  5.2  106.5  92.7  99.9 
Germany  101.7  92.4  92.5  8.7  3.7  89.4  80.1  80.2 
Greece  64.7  65.2  64.6  -2.3  11.7  55.3  55.8  55.2 
Ireland  106.1  101.5  105.0  2.8  5.5  97.8  93.3  96.7 
Italy  95.8  81.5  93.7  4.4  12.1  79.3  65.0  77.3 
Japan  75.3  70.0  70.5  0.0  4.8  70.5  65.2  65.7 
Netherlands  108.9  101.4  101.5  12.1  0.1  96.8  89.2  89.3 
New Zealand  64.8  na  62.9  -0.3  0.3  64.8  na  62.8 
Norway  131.6  125.0  125.5  11.9  -3.9  123.6  117.0  117.4 
Portugal  53.9  53.5  53.3  2.1  2.7  49.1  48.7  48.6 
Spain  76.9  76.7  74.2  -0.3  10.6  66.6  66.3  63.9 
Sweden  88.6  85.5  85.6  4.8  -3.7  87.4  84.3  84.4 
Switzerland  91.3  na  83.5  6.7  -2.8  87.3  na  79.5 
United Kingdom  90.5  84.8  79.3  2.2  -0.1  88.4  82.7  77.2 
United States  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 Source: Cette (2005). 
 
In terms of the six countries whose productivity experience is examined in this 
report, Ireland was the most productive in 2004 at 108.1 per cent of the U.S. level, 
followed by the United States, (100.0 per cent), Finland (91.9 per cent), the United 
Kingdom (88.9 per cent), Sweden (88.5 per cent), and Australia (80.8 per cent). The 
output per hour level in all these countries exceeded that in Canada (79.0 per cent of the 
U.S. level).   
 
C.  Productivity Growth Rates in OECD Countries 
 
1)  Labour Productivity 
                                                                                                                                                   
total economy, in contrast to the levels of business sector output per hour in Canada relative to the United 
States in Chart 2 and discussed in the previous section.   24
 
Table 3 also presents estimates of average annual growth rates for total economy 
output per hour, based on purchasing power parities, for 23 OECD countries for the 
1950-73, 1973-95, 1995-2000, 2000-2004, and 1973-2004 periods. The source of these 
estimates is the total economy database maintained by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. 
 
In the 1950-73 postwar period, known as the golden age of capitalism, the 
average rate of productivity growth in OECD countries was a robust 4.59 per cent per 
year.
9 This rapid productivity growth in many countries was due to convergence toward 
the U.S. productivity level. In 1950, the labour productivity gap between the United 
States and almost all other countries provided considerable scope for technological catch-
up. Japan experienced the fastest productivity growth (7.27 per cent), followed by 
Portugal and South Korea. All three of these countries had very low relative productivity 
levels in 1950. New Zealand experienced the slowest labour productivity growth over 
this period (2.18 per cent), followed by the United States (2.55 per cent). Both of these 
countries had high relative productivity levels in 1950, with the United States the 
productivity leader and New Zealand close behind at 94.9 per cent of the U.S. level. 
 
All 23 OECD countries experienced a slowdown in output per hour growth in the 
1973-1995 period relative to the 1950-73 period, with average productivity growth falling 
by nearly one half (2.27 points) from 4.59 per cent to 2.32 per cent per year. This 
development in many countries reflects the ending or slowing down of the period of 
convergence to the U.S. productivity level. The country with the most rapid labour 
productivity growth during this period was South Korea (4.92 per cent per year), 
followed by Ireland and Spain. New Zealand again experienced the slowest productivity 
growth (0.15 per cent), followed by Switzerland, Canada and the United States. 
 
The year 1995 is said to represent the beginning of the “new economy” era, 
although this trend has not manifested itself in the aggregate labour productivity data. 
Average output per hour growth in the OECD in 1995-2000 was only 2.29 per cent, 
virtually identical to that recorded in the 1973-1995 period. In the 2000-2004 period, 
average productivity growth fell to 1.70 per cent. Of the 23 countries, about half (13) 
experienced an acceleration of output per hour growth in the 1995-2000 period relative to 
1973-1995. The largest change in productivity growth was not in the United States, 
where a 0.88 per centage point acceleration took place (with average annual output per 
hour growth rising from 1.24 per cent to 2.12 per cent), but in Ireland (1.84 points), 
followed by New Zealand (1.40 points), and Switzerland (1.01 points). Canada 
experienced a productivity growth pick-up of 0.52 points from 1.05 per cent to 1.57 per 
cent per year.  
                                                  
9 The averages across countries in Table 3 are simple arithmetic averages.  This means that they have not 
been weighted to control for differences in the size of countries.  If the growth rates were recalculated using 
as weights the population shares of each country in the total population across all countries considered, the 
resulting weighted average growth rates would be slightly lower, since countries such as Ireland, with rapid 
productivity growth rates, would receive less importance in the calculation of the weighted average than in 
that of the unweighted average.  For the simple exposition of this section, this distinction is moot.   25
   
In terms of the six countries whose productivity experience is examined in this 
report, all six had faster productivity growth than Canada (1.55 per cent) in the 1995-
2000 period: Ireland (5.80 per cent), Finland (3.11 per cent), Australia (2.29 per cent), 
Sweden (2.26 per cent), the United States (2.12 per cent), and the United Kingdom (2.05 
per cent).  Equally, four of the six outperformed Canada’s 0.52 point rise in productivity 
growth between the periods: Ireland (1.84 points), the United States (0.88 points), 
Sweden (0.79 points), and Australia (0.74 points). Finland had virtually the same 
acceleration (0.51 points) as that of Canada. Only the United Kingdom saw a deceleration 
in productivity growth (-0.31) between periods. If the longer 1995-2004 period is used 
instead of 1995-2000, the same country patterns emerge. 
 
  Between the 1995-2000 and 2000-2004 periods, 14 of the 23 OECD countries in 
Table 3 experienced a productivity growth deceleration. The only country that 
experienced a significant acceleration in productivity growth after 2000 was the United 
States, with output per hour growth rising 0.82 points to 2.94 per cent from 2.12 per cent 
per year. The country with the second largest productivity improvement was Norway 
(0.38 points). In the 2000-2004 period, only Ireland and Korea had labour productivity 
growth exceeding that of the United States.  
 
2)  Multifactor Productivity 
 
  In addition to labour productivity, many economists are interested in multifactor 
productivity (MFP), which provides a better indication of trends in the efficiency of use 
of both capital and labour together. As discussed briefly in the first section in this part of 
the report, in a production function framework, MFP is a component of labour 
productivity. The term “technological coefficient” is often applied rather than MFP in 
theoretical contexts, and since the pioneering work of Solow (1957), researchers have 
generally associated MFP growth with technological progress. However, not all 
economists agree that MFP reflects the state of technological development fully or even 
partially. This issue is discussed by Lipsey and Carlaw (2000) and by the two other 
contributions to the Symposium on Total Factor Productivity in the inaugural issue of the 
International Productivity Monitor. The least optimistic opinion on what MFP means is 
that it is a measure of our ignorance in the sense that measured MFP growth captures all 
effects that are not explicitly accounted for by the production function. Nonetheless, the 
interpretation of MFP growth as technological change – or at least “disembodied” 
technological change unrelated to new technologies embedded in capital goods – persists. 
Given the disagreement surrounding the meaning of MFP, the following discussion will 
limit itself to a simple enumeration of MFP growth in OECD countries. 
 
  Chart 3 provides estimates of multifactor productivity growth at the total 
economy level for 18 OECD countries for the 1990-95 and 1995-2002 periods based on 
the OECD productivity database. In terms of the six countries whose productivity 
experiences are examined in this report, four had more rapid MFP growth than Canada in 
1995-2002 (Ireland, Finland, Australia and the United States), one (the United Kingdom) 
performed about as well as Canada, and one (Sweden) had slightly slower MFP growth   26
than Canada.  Ireland had the most rapid MFP growth out of all 18 countries for which 
data are available in both the 1990-95 and 1995-2002 periods.  Finland had the next most 
rapid MFP growth in 1995-2002, at about half of Ireland’s rate. Australia and the United 
Kingdom had the most rapid MFP growth in 1990-1995 next to Ireland out of the six 
countries whose productivity experiences are examined in this report, but were out-paced 
by Italy. 
 
Chart 3: Multifactor Productivity Growth in the Total Economy, 1990-





























(1) 1992-1995 instead of 1990-95. 
Note: 1995-2001 instead of 1995-2002 for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Pilat (2005) based on OECD Productivity Database, March 2005. 
 
D.  The Relationship Between Labour Productivity and GDP Per 
Capita in OECD Countries 
 
  High relative labour productivity levels for a country, as represented by output per 
hour, do not necessarily translate into high relative income levels, as represented by GDP 
per capita. This is certainly the case for many European countries, which, as noted above, 
have very high relative levels of output per hour, but which also have levels of GDP per 
capita well below that of the United States. As discussed in the first section in this part of 
the report, this situation reflects the fact that GDP per capita is determined not just by 
output per hour, but also by the number of hours worked per employed person and the 
share of the population that is employed. This latter factor is in turn affected by the 
unemployment rate, the participation rate, and the proportion of the working age 
population in the total population. 
 
  Table 5, drawn from van Ark (2002), provides a reconciliation of GDP per capita 
and output per hour relative levels for OECD countries in 2001. The United States had by 
far the highest level of GDP per capita in the OECD, with Norway a distant second at   27
83.3 per cent of the U.S. level. Despite its high relative income, the U.S. labour 





Source: van Ark (2002). 
 
  In terms of the six countries whose productivity experience is examined in this 
report, while all six had higher levels of output per hour than Canada, only two had 
higher levels of GDP per capita (the United States and Ireland).This situation was largely 
accounted for by fewer hours worked in the United Kingdom, Finland, and Sweden 
relative to Canada. Ireland and Finland are notable for having quite high levels of output 
per hour relative to the United States (98.4 and 86.3 per cent of the U.S. level   28
respectively) but much lower relative levels GDP per capita (81.5 and 71.0 per cent 
respectively). In Ireland, about half of this gap between relative GDP per hour and GDP 
per capita levels was due to fewer average hours worked than in the United States, with 
the other half due to a lower labour force participation rate, very slightly offset by a lower 
unemployment rate and higher proportion of the working age population in the total 
population. In Finland, the gap was due mostly to fewer average hours worked, but also 
to a higher unemployment rate and slightly lower labour force participation rate. 
 
II.  General Lessons from OECD Productivity Experience 
 
This part of the report briefly reviews the main findings of the OECD growth 
project and the numerous studies by the McKinsey Global Institute on international 
productivity differences. 
 
A.  OECD Growth Project 
 
This section briefly reviews the important work that the OECD has done as part of 
the OECD growth project, published in the documents Sources of Economic Growth 
(OECD, 2003) and Understanding Economic Growth (OECD, 2004c).  
 
  The OECD growth project analyzed the sources of economic growth based upon 
aggregate data and using cross-country regression analysis, with a particular emphasis on 
the ways in which policies affect outcomes.  It argued that the causal variables looked at 
are able to explain much of the observed growth differences over time and across 
countries.  It was found that investment in physical and in human capital was important to 
growth; that sound macro policies yield higher growth; and that the overall size of 
government in the economy may hinder growth if it becomes too large, although the 
pattern was mixed.  Some government spending was found conducive to growth, while 
high levels of direct taxation (taxes on wages and profits) discouraged growth.  R&D 
activities by the business sector had high social returns, and hence contributed to growth, 
but there was no evidence in this analysis of positive effects from government R&D.  The 
study found some evidence that financial markets are important to growth, through 
helping to channel resources towards the most rewarding activities and through 
encouraging investment. 
 
  A very interesting and surprising result from the aggregate regression analysis is 
that “exposure to international trade” is an important determinant of output per working 
age person.  The analysis concludes that an increase of 10 per centage points in trade 
exposure (an adjusted average of exports and imports as per centages of GDP) raises 
output per person by 4 per centage points.  Baily (2003) has noted that this result is not 
surprising in terms of the direction of the effect, but is remarkable in the magnitude – the 
report states that between the 1980s and 1990s trade exposure on average increased by 
about 10 per centage points.  This result, if taken at face value, gives strong support to the 
view that increased globalization improves economic performance.  It suggests that all 
OECD countries should move aggressively to remove remaining barriers to trade, and do 
so for their own advantage.   29
 
Human resources and skills development issues related to productivity also  
receive particular emphasis. For example, the OECD has found that policies of certain 
countries to re-integrate low-skilled workers, while  resulting in a widening of the 
employment base and increased potential growth, depressed temporarily productivity 
growth through a negative composition effect on labour quality.  
 
At the macro level, the OECD has thus identified education, innovation, 
deregulation and investment as the basic determinants of productivity growth. It has also 
identified inflation, fiscal policy, international trade, and the financial system as policy 
and institutional determinants of growth. At the industry and firm level, the OECD has 
identified market conditions, competition, and innovation and R&D as key productivity 
drivers. 
   
Peter Nicholson has applied the results of the OECD growth project to the 
Canadian economy (Nicholson, 2003). In terms of his growth scorecard, Canada rates 
highly, with three stars for three of the five growth drivers (sound macro policy, human 
capital, and exposure to trade) and two stars for productive investment. According to 
Nicholson, Canada only fares poorly in terms of innovation, which he gives one star. 
 
  Based on the results of the OECD growth project, Nicholson provides interesting 
stylized estimates of the impact of seven growth drivers (human capital, physical capital, 
R&D, trade exposure, tax burden, inflation level, and inflation variability) on GDP per 
capita in a steady state environment. These estimates are provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: QUANTIFYING SOME KEY GROWTH DRIVERS* 
Impact on Level of GDP per Capita in Steady State 
Driving Factor  Definition  Change  Impact 
Typical Change 
over 80s and 90s 
in OECD 
Human Capital  Average years of 
education  + 1 Year  4% - 7%  + 1.5 years in G-7 
Physical Capital  Private non-res. 
Invest. as % GDP  + 1 pct. Pt  1.3%  Variable 
R&D  Business R&D 
% GDP  + 0.1 pct. pt.  > 1.2%  About 0.1 pct. pt. 
Trade Exposure  Ave of Exp/Imp 
% GDP  + 10 pct. Pts  4%  About 10 pct. pts 
Tax Burden  Govt. Revenue 
% GDP  + 1 pct. pt.  (0.6%) – (0.7%)  About 1.5 pct. pts 
Inflation Level  Final Consumption 




Deviation  - 1 pct. pt.  2%  About 2/3 pct. pts 
*Based on regression analysis of 21 OECD countries over 1971-98. 
Source: Nicholson (2003) based on OECD (2003). 
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B.  McKinsey Global Institute Productivity Studies
10 
 
The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) is a think tank based in Washington, D.C. 
founded in 1990 by McKinsey & Company with the objective of analyzing international 
productivity levels from both economic and management perspectives.  Over the last 
fifteen years, MGI has studied most of the world’s major economies.  In each case, MGI 
uses microeconomic analysis on a sector-by-sector level to study the effects that industry 
decisions ultimately have on national productivity.  This section seeks to synthesize some 
of these findings to see what potential lessons can be drawn regarding productivity level 
differences between Canada and other countries. 
 
1)  General Findings 
 
Time and again, the McKinsey Global Institute’s studies have returned to the 
same story in trying to explain productivity gaps between countries: a lack of competitive 
intensity.  To the extent that certain European and Japanese sectors seem to consistently 
trail the United States in productivity, these sectors are nearly always characterized by a 
small number of domestic firms who engage in little price or service competition because 
of regulatory protection in the form of product market restrictions and trade barriers.  
MGI finds that such restrictions lead to managerial complacency, a consequent lack of 
innovation in production processes, and ultimately to a productivity performance below 
that of the technological leader.  Potential factors related to competition that have been 
identified by MGI as directly affecting productivity are the following. 
 
•  Concentration: A high market share held by a small number of firms is not 
necessarily inconsistent with intense competition.  Concentration can improve 
productivity through achieving economies of scale, and it can also boost 
productivity if it allows a small number of large firms to compete intensely with 
each other.  Examples of highly concentrated yet highly competitive industries 
include the Dutch banking industry and the Swedish automobile industry. 
 
•  Trade Protection: Tariffs and quotas reduce productivity through shielding 
industries from international competition and so making the adoption of global 
best practices unnecessary.  The automobile industry in Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom, the food processing industry in Japan, and many Swedish 
service industries are all examples highlighted by MGI of industries whose 
productivity performance has been hindered by trade protection. 
 
•  Deregulation: MGI highlights the airline, telecommunications and banking 
industries as cases in which deregulation has boosted productivity, and in which 
countries that have chosen to delay or forgo deregulation have consequently 
suffered lower productivity levels than the early deregulators. 
                                                  
10 This section draws on a recent CSLS research report by Kellison (2004).   31
 
Other competition-related factors can affect productivity in a more indirect 
fashion. 
 
•  Minimum Wages: Higher wages typically have the effect of reducing the number 
of low-skill jobs, as the benefit of these low-skill services is outweighed by the 
higher cost of providing them.  While this has the effect of raising conventionally-
measured average labour productivity, MGI argues that overall “service 
productivity” is negatively affected because the range of services that is offered 
shrinks. 
 
•  Work Rules: MGI recognizes that some labour market inflexibilities can be 
beneficial.  However, collective agreement terms that are not adjustable to market 
realities can negatively affect productivity by preventing productivity-enhancing 
reorganizations of work. 
 
•  Zoning Laws: Some European countries have zoning regulations that have a 
negative impact on productivity by making it difficult for firms to purchase 
parcels of land of a required size, and through creating an artificial scarcity of 
land and thereby making land overly expensive.  This affects productivity because 
high rents hinder the ability of smaller firms to innovate, and because larger firms 
have difficulties achieving optimal scale. 
 
Perhaps even more important than the market conditions under which a firm 
operates is the way its managers choose to react to those conditions.  Competitiveness is 
the main driver of managerial innovation, but that managerial innovation (or lack thereof) 
is what affects productivity, first at the firm level, then the industry level, and ultimately 
at the national level.  MGI makes the following observations related to managerial 
innovation. 
 
•  Best Practice: Managers need to be aware of best practices in a given industry, 
and be prepared to implement them.  MGI states that sufficient exposure to 
competition will ensure that this is the case. 
 
•  Human Capital: MGI finds little evidence that labour skills at the production 
level differ greatly across countries.  However, the qualifications of managers can 
have a significant impact on productivity, through entrepreneurship and the 
training of production workers. 
 
•  Marketing: MGI finds that the U.S. telecommunications sector’s productivity 
performance has been positively affected through marketing, since the resulting 
greater demand for telecommunication services means that there is greater output 
for a given investment in fixed capital. 
 
•  Information Technology: Although few would dispute that investment in 
information technology can have a significant impact on productivity growth,   32
MGI concludes that realizing its full benefit requires an appropriate application.  
In addition to the effect of IT use on productivity growth, the presence and strong 
productivity performance of industries producing IT goods also positively affect 
overall manufacturing productivity growth. 
 
•  Capital Intensity: MGI finds that improvements in capital intensity are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for improvements in productivity.  This is 
because increasing the amount of capital per worker does not necessarily mean 
that the capital is being used efficiently.  Improvements in capital productivity are 
often dependent on other managerial and competitive factors. 
 
The final category of productivity determinants is demand factors.  If a 
competitive market forces a firm to innovate in order to create better goods and services 
at lower prices (and costs), then there should be an increase in demand for those 
improved products, which should more than justify the initial costs of innovation and 
increase firm profits.  There are other demand factors besides this general desire for 
improved goods that can affect a firm’s decisions and thus productivity.  Briefly, income 
levels, cyclical demand factors, and general consumer preferences can all affect the 
format, output level, and ultimately productivity of a firm. 
 
2)  Implications for Canada  
 
The McKinsey Global Institute has not produced a report on Canadian 
productivity. However, the findings from the McKinsey productivity studies on industry 
productivity differentials between the United States and a number of major developed 
and developing countries may have relevance for the explanation of industry productivity 
differentials between the United States and Canada.  In some respects, the Canadian 
economy is a bit of a hybrid between the U.S. free-market system and the more sheltered, 
socially-conscious systems of countries like France or Sweden.  Canada is more globally-
exposed than most EU countries, yet it also retains a certain level of trade protection and 
restricts entry to some domestic sectors.  It also has a more developed welfare state than 
the United States in terms of more government control of social programs such as health 
care and pensions. 
 
However, given the overall similarity between Canada and the United States, 
which is much greater than between the United States and Europe, Japan, Brazil, and 
India, the findings of the MGI studies cannot be indiscriminately applied to Canada-U.S. 
productivity differences at the industry level.  Nonetheless, in lieu of undertaking an 
MGI-style detailed report on a number of industries for Canada, a few broad conclusions 
can be made. 
 
Many managerial and consumer behaviour factors are similar across the two 
countries.  One area in which Canada appears to be lagging the United States to a large 
degree is the retail trade sector.  It appears that managers in the Canadian retail industry 
may not have adopted new processes as rapidly as their U.S. counterparts, although direct 
evidence of this has not been found.  Wal-Mart has lead the U.S. retail trade industry in   33
this regard, spurring other firms to innovate through competitive pressure.  Apparently 
Wal-Mart has not yet had this effect in Canada. 
 
In terms of competitive factors – the focus of so much of MGI’s work –  Canadian 
service-sector firms may be less exposed to competition than U.S. firms and have a 
smaller market in which to operate.  The poor productivity performance of financial and 
cultural industries is consistent with this hypothesis.  Likewise, the strong relative 
performance of Canada’s natural resource industries may be related to the intense 
international competition they face. 
 
Many competitive factors are quite similar across the two countries, such as 
zoning laws and minimum wages.  However, the OECD (2004), in its 2004 survey of 
Canada, provides an in-depth analysis of product market competition.  It finds that, out of 
21 OECD countries, Canada scored 11
th according to a composite competition indicator, 
compared to a 4
th place ranking for the United States.  Specifically, the OECD sees 
barriers to foreign direct investment as Canada’s largest weakness in terms of product 
market competition.  The survey also states that the Canadian Competition Act still faces 
some challenges in providing Canada with a fully effective anti-trust regime. 
 
III.  Lessons from Country-Specific Productivity Experience 
 
This part of the report examines the productivity experiences of six OECD 
countries and attempts to draw possible lessons for Canadian productivity policy. As it is 
well beyond the scope of the report to discuss the productivity experience of all OECD 
countries, a sub-set of OECD countries has been selected on the basis of the productivity 
performance and relevance to Canada of these countries. Based on discussions with 
HRSDC officials, it was decided to focus on the following six countries: the United 
States, Ireland, Australia, the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden. 
 
Given the similarities between Canada and the United States, the productivity 
experience of the United States, and in particular the reasons for that country’s superior 
productivity growth, is very relevant to Canada. Ireland, with the highest labour 
productivity growth rate among OECD countries since 1973, has been a fantastic 
economic success and the reasons for its success merit careful study. Australia has a 
slightly higher labour productivity level than Canada and has enjoyed faster productivity 
growth since 1973, and especially since 1995. It is extremely similar to Canada in many 
ways, so policies that fostered productivity growth there may have particular relevance to 
Canada. The United Kingdom in 2004 had a labour productivity level above that of 
Canada, and has undergone a number of market-oriented reforms that may have 
relevance for Canada. Finland and Sweden have higher labour productivity levels than 
Canada and both countries have been very successful in the high-tech area, with possible 
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A.  United States 
 
  The United States has seen remarkable labour productivity growth since 1995, 
and this growth is even more remarkable when compared to the stagnant growth of the 
1973-1995 period.  Furthermore, it is now widely accepted that, in addition to the original 
acceleration in labour productivity growth in 1995-2000 relative to 1973-1995, the 
United States has experienced an additional post-2000 labour productivity growth 
acceleration. 
 
  The resurgence of U.S. labour productivity growth after 1995 has been an 
enormous boon to living standards in the United States, is perhaps the most important 
factor in the competitiveness of U.S. firms in the global market, and has important 
implications for increasing the fiscal room to manoeuvre as the demographic crunch sets 
in.  Given the desire of other countries to pursue these same outcomes, the important 
questions raised by the impressive U.S. labour productivity performance are what factors 
have been behind this performance and will these factors be successful at raising labour 
productivity growth if implemented in other countries. 
 
1)  Information Technology and the “New Economy” Explanation 
 
  The earliest explanation of the U.S. labour productivity growth acceleration, and 
one that is still widely accepted by the general public today, is that the advent of 
information technology in the workplace revolutionized production processes and supply-
chain management, thereby ushering in a “new economy” characterized by virtually 
limitless technology-driven productivity gains.  The logic of this argument, which 
focuses on the use of information technology, is appealing; but is this explanation the 
whole story, or is it even correct? 
 
  A large literature has developed around this question of a new economy, and the 
generally accepted conclusion seems to be that information and communications 
technologies (ICT) were indeed responsible for much of the post-1995 labour 
productivity growth acceleration in the United States, although not in the straightforward 
way that has typically been postulated.  Most importantly, it has been found that the 
production of ICT can be as important or even more important than the use of ICT in 
terms of improving labour productivity growth. 
 
  In the typical growth accounting framework,
11 ICT use affects labour productivity 
growth through two channels.  First, investment in ICT capital increases capital intensity 
                                                  
11 The standard growth accounting framework divides labour productivity growth into its capital deepening 
and multifactor productivity (MFP, also called total factor productivity, or TFP) growth components.  Such 
a growth accounting framework was presented in the first part of this report for Canada. In the language of 
that example, capital intensity is synonymous with capital services per hour, and capital deepening refers to 
increases in capital intensity. Extensions to this standard framework have allowed a finer level of 
decomposition, for example into these two components as well as into the contributions of labour quality 
and capital quality (also called capital broadening).  The contribution of capital deepening can be further 
broken down into contributions from ICT capital and non-ICT capital; and the contribution of MFP growth 
can be broken down into that from ICT-producing industries and that from ICT-using industries.  Extended   35
in the same fashion as any other type of investment.  Second, the MFP growth of ICT-
using industries can be improved by the effects of the ICT goods that have been invested 
in, for example a new internet-connected computer facilitating more efficient 
procurement and distribution.  This second channel is the proposed new economy effect. 
 
  In order to clarify this process, the most recent growth accounting exercise 
undertaken by Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004) can be taken as an example (Table 7).  
Investment in ICT shows up in the contribution to labour productivity growth from 
information technology capital deepening (sixth row from the bottom).  But this 
contribution only reflects the simple effect of workers having more capital to work with.  
The intangible (new economy) effects of ICT in terms of revolutionizing production 
processes show up in the bottom-most row, the contribution to overall labour productivity 
growth of MFP growth among ICT users (defined simply as non-ICT producers).
12 
 
Gordon (2000) and Bosworth and Triplett (2001) expressed skepticism when the 
new economy hypothesis started to attract attention.  For example, the latter state that the 
post-1995 U.S. labour productivity growth acceleration was driven to a large extent both 
by ICT capital deepening and by MFP growth among ICT users, but find that there is 
little evidence to suggest that the MFP gains among ICT users were actually driven by 
the putative efficiency effects of ICT.  On the other hand, Kiley (1999), Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt (2000a and 2000b) and Stiroh (2001) use econometric and case study evidence at the 
industry and firm level to show that ICT users do indeed appear to exhibit more rapid 
productivity growth than firms or industries that use ICT less intensively. 
 
Leaving this disagreement aside for a moment, it is also important to note that the 
growth accounting studies identify a third major driver of labour productivity growth 
after 1995.  This is the MFP growth among ICT-producing industries, which, although a 
smaller source of labour productivity growth than MFP growth for ICT users, still makes 
a sizeable contribution.  Such evidence is the basis for claims that ICT production is at 
least as important for labour productivity growth as ICT use.  The argument is that there 
have been phenomenal technological advances in the manufacture of semiconductors, 
computers, communications equipment, and other types of machinery and electronics, 
which accounts for rapid MFP growth in these industries.
13  Furthermore, as the demand 
                                                                                                                                                   
growth accounting exercises such as these have been carried out for the United States extensively, for 
example by Oliner and Sichel (2000 and 2002), the Council of Economic Advisers (2001), Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson (2001), and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2003 and 2004). The latter study’s 
estimates will be discussed in this section. 
12 This process can even be examined from a step earlier.  The reason investment in ICT increases in the 
first place is that the price of ICT assets falls relative to that for other types of capital.  These price declines 
in ICT assets are related to technological progress in the manufacture of these assets, e.g. the case of 
Moore’s Law, which states that the computing power of newly manufactured semiconductors doubles 
every 18 months or so.  This technological progress in the manufacture of ICT goods shows up in the 
contribution to labour productivity growth from MFP growth among ICT producers (the second row from 
the bottom in Table 7). 
13 Bosworth and Triplett (2001) state that the growth accounting evidence may not be wholly accurate due 
to errors in the measurement of ICT capital and the output of some industries.  In particular, these 
technological advances lead to quality improvements, and it is difficult to completely account for such 
quality improvements when estimating price indices for ICT goods.   36
for ICT goods has vastly expanded, so too has the output of these industries, which 
consequently make a very large contribution to the acceleration of productivity growth. 
 
Table 7: Sources of Growth in the U.S. Business Sector
1981-2003 1981-1989 1989-2000 1989-1995 1995-2000 2000-2003
Growth Rates (compound average annual rates, per cent per year)
Private Output 3.51 3.78 3.60 2.64 4.76 2.48
   Hours Worked 1.36 2.11 1.53 1.06 2.09 -1.23
   Average Labour Productivity 2.15 1.67 2.07 1.58 2.67 3.71
Absolute Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (percentage points)
   Average Labour Productivity 2.15 1.67 2.07 1.58 2.67 3.71
      Contribution from Capital Deepening 1.13 0.73 1.13 0.83 1.50 2.17
         Information Technology 0.62 0.43 0.72 0.49 1.01 0.77
         Non-Information Technology 0.50 0.30 0.41 0.34 0.49 1.40
      Contribution of Labour Quality 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.37 0.21 0.11
      Total Factor Productivity 0.77 0.68 0.65 0.38 0.96 1.43
         Information Technology 0.36 0.26 0.41 0.27 0.58 0.43
         Non-Information Technology 0.41 0.43 0.23 0.11 0.38 1.01
Relative Contributions to Labour Productivity Growth (per cent)
   Average Labour Productivity 100 100 100 100 100 100
      Contribution from Capital Deepening 52.4 43.6 54.6 52.4 56.2 58.5
         Information Technology 29.0 25.7 34.9 30.8 37.9 20.7
         Non-Information Technology 23.4 17.9 19.7 21.6 18.3 37.7
      Contribution of Labour Quality 12.0 15.6 14.3 23.6 7.7 2.9
      Total Factor Productivity 35.6 40.8 31.1 24.1 36.1 38.6
         Information Technology 16.6 15.3 19.9 17.1 21.9 11.5
         Non-Information Technology 19.0 25.5 11.2 7.0 14.3 27.1
Source: Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004).  
 
The relative importance of these three major sources of the U.S. aggregate labour 
productivity growth acceleration – economy-wide ICT capital deepening, MFP growth 
among ICT users, and MFP growth of ICT-producing industries – can be discerned by 
considering evidence from industry case studies undertaken by the McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI).  Kellison (2004:16-17), in reviewing MGI (2001), shows that industries 
experiencing little or no labour productivity growth acceleration between 1987-1995 and 
1995-1999 (and, due to offsetting, accounting together for less than one per cent of the 
business sector labour productivity growth acceleration between these periods) accounted 
for 69 per cent of total business sector output and 62 per cent of the acceleration in ICT 
capital intensity between these same periods.  This highlights three important points: the 
U.S. labour productivity growth acceleration has not been broadly based across 
industries; the increase in ICT capital intensity, on the other hand, has been distributed 
fairly evenly across industries; and consequently, much ICT capital intensity growth has 
not been effective in terms of increasing labour productivity growth. 
 
Indeed, MGI (2001) finds that the 38 per cent of the U.S. business sector that 
contributed 99 per cent of the labour productivity growth acceleration was made up of 
just six industries, namely retail trade, wholesale trade, telecommunications, computer 
manufacturing, semiconductor manufacturing, and the portion of the financial sector   37
dealing in securities.
14  Furthermore, these six industries, for the most part, saw only 
modest accelerations in ICT capital intensity growth; and MGI states that ICT in general 
played only a minor role in the labour productivity growth accelerations of these 
industries. 
 
For example, the surge in retail labour productivity growth was found to be 
caused in part by the ICT-driven managerial innovations at Wal-Mart, but was found to 
be amplified to a large degree by the competition among other retailers that this set off, 
and the cost cutting and matching innovation that this competition necessitated.  
Likewise, the productivity performance of the semiconductors industry was found to be 
primarily attributable to intense competition.  MGI (2001) states that the other industries 
experiencing large labour productivity growth accelerations were affected by more 
traditional process innovations rather than ICT-induced changes, and that some of the 
aggregate acceleration also appeared at the time to be largely cyclical in nature, a point 
also made by Gordon (2000). 
 
The bottom line from the McKinsey study, in the context of the growth 
accounting evidence discussed above, is that the production of ICT was an extremely 
important factor in the labour productivity growth acceleration between the periods 
examined.  The technological advances fuelling the phenomenal accelerations in 
telecommunications, computers and semiconductors would have lead to a large 
acceleration in MFP growth among these ICT producers, and hence a large contribution 
to the aggregate labour productivity growth acceleration from MFP growth among ICT-
producing industries. 
 
The importance of ICT use for the productivity growth acceleration cannot be 
discounted completely, although MGI does largely dismiss the new economy hypothesis.  
ICT use, according to the case study evidence provided by MGI, has only proven to be 
effective in increasing labour productivity growth at the industry level (i.e. through 
increasing the MFP growth of ICT users) in those industries in which complementary 
managerial innovations were also undertaken.  ICT, in other words, is no panacea in 
terms of increasing productivity growth at the industry or firm level, and is therefore not 
able to fully explain the labour productivity growth acceleration at the aggregate level.
15 
 
                                                  
14 Sharpe (2004b) finds that an additional acceleration in U.S. labour productivity growth after 2000 has 
also been concentrated in a small number of industries, namely professional and business services, 
information services, wholesale trade, and retail trade.  The issue of the contribution of ICT to this post-
2000 acceleration will be addressed briefly below. 
15 To put this argument in terms of the growth accounting estimates in Table 7, the 14.3 per cent 
contribution of MFP growth among ICT users to overall labour productivity growth in 1995-2000 
obviously cannot simply be dismissed as unimportant.  However, this contribution would perhaps have 
been much larger – and labour productivity growth more rapid – if more ICT users had made 
complementary management and process changes.  MGI suggests that such management innovations were 
much more important than the technology involved; but to the extent that the management changes were 
only made possible by the availability of the new technologies, clearly ICT investment cannot be seen as 
entirely superfluous.  Also note that in the 2000-2003 period, which could not have been observed by MGI 
in 2001, the contribution to labour productivity growth of MFP growth among ICT users rose substantially 
to 27.1 per cent.  The post-2000 period will be discussed in more detail below.   38
The MGI evidence also provides an interesting perspective on the increasing rate 
of ICT capital deepening.  In a growth accounting framework, such accelerating 
investment will always make a positive contribution to increasing labour productivity 
growth, since such growth decompositions are based on a mathematical identity.  But 
MGI doubts that the ICT accumulation of the post-1995 period really had the effect 
suggested by the capital intensity estimates.  Much of the ICT capital deepening 
acceleration, according to the findings of MGI, was associated with year 2000 
preparedness, and also with equipment upgrading that was perhaps slightly overzealous 
in the sense that the associated productivity gains would be minimal. 
 
The revised new economy explanation recognizes the importance of both ICT 
production and use in the U.S. labour productivity growth acceleration, and this 
explanation has been largely confirmed in terms of Canada-U.S. differences as well.  Rao 
and Tang (2001) find that the productivity increases among ICT producers in Canada 
between 1989-1995 and 1995-1999 were impressive on their own, but that they were 
exceeded by U.S. ICT producers, and more importantly, that the ICT production sector in 
the United States is much more important relative to the total economy than is the case in 
Canada.  In updating this work, Ho, Rao and Tang (2004) find that about 70 per cent of 
U.S. labour productivity growth in 1995-2000 was accounted for by ICT use and ICT 
production together, but that this figure was only around 60 per cent in Canada.  Similar 
conclusions are also reached by van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2003). 
 
2)  Factors Underlying the ICT Revolution 
 
Information and communications technologies, whether through their production 
or through their usage, have propelled U.S. labour productivity to an unprecedented 
growth performance.  However, this is not an entirely satisfying explanation of the U.S. 
labour productivity growth acceleration, because it leaves the sources of the ICT 
revolution unaddressed.  Veugelers (2005) adds to Gordon (2004) in attempting to 
uncover some of these sources. 
 
Probably the most important aspect of the U.S. economy in terms of facilitating 
the take-off of ICT production and use is the university system.  The combination of 
competition between private and public universities with the system of peer-reviewed 
research grants ensures that the best students are attracted to the United States, and 
consequently that the United States is always a world leader in research.  More 
importantly, the world-class research produced by U.S. universities gives a strong 
incentive for linkages to form between the higher education sector and private businesses 
in terms of commercializing this knowledge.
16 
                                                  
16 This cycle of leading research spurring linkages with businesses and the resulting market for knowledge 
feeding back into attracting the brightest researchers may be weakening.  With increasingly strict visa laws 
and procedures being implemented in the United States in recent years, some of the best students and 
researchers are either choosing to forego the tedious process required to obtain a visa or are being denied 
the ability to work and study within U.S. borders altogether.  While it would not appear that the United 
States is in immediate danger of losing its status as the world leader in research, the weakening of this 
virtuous cycle may indeed have implications in terms of sustaining the currently torrid pace of productivity 
growth over the long term.   39
 
Other aspects mentioned by Veugelers as driving the ICT revolution include 
strong intellectual property rights;
17 flexible labour markets in terms of both international 
and internal migration of highly skilled workers; a large and unified market that is mostly 
free of barriers related to language, customs and standards; and well-developed and 
flexible financial markets.
18  This latter factor is especially important in terms of 
providing entrepreneurs and innovating firms with access to venture capital and other 
sources of finance.  Above all, intense product market competition, embodying 
traditionally strict laws against anti-competitive practices, ensures that the most 
innovative firms are able to grow quickly and thereby challenge less innovative firms to 
improve their performance or exit the market.  Such competitive intensity would appear 
to be crucial in motivating the diffusion of ICT, as industries protected from competition 




3)  The Recent Importance of Non-ICT Factors 
 
  As ICT became the dominant focus of the productivity debate in the United 
States, along with the related issues of innovation and competition to a lesser extent, 
other productivity drivers, such as human capital, capital intensity in general (rather than 
ICT-specific) and traditional managerial and process innovations, were overlooked to a 
certain degree.  While these drivers were undoubtedly playing some role in the rapid U.S. 
labour productivity growth of the late 1990s – both on their own and as complementary 
forces to ICT production and use – they appear to have become more important in the 
continuation of impressive productivity growth after the collapse of the ICT revolution in 
2000. 
 
                                                  
17 Intellectual property rights do not have a simple linear relationship with innovation and hence 
productivity.  When they are too weak, businesses and researchers may feel that invention and innovation 
are not worthwhile since there will be limited opportunities to market the invention and recoup its 
development costs before it is copied by other businesses.  On the other hand, overly strict intellectual 
property rights can prevent the diffusion of inventions once they have been marketed by allowing the 
inventors to charge high monopoly prices for their inventions for an overly long period of time and by 
denying other researchers enough information on which to invent technologies complementary to earlier 
inventions.  While it is tempting to state that the United States must have struck the right balance between 
these competing concerns based on evidence of U.S. innovativeness, it is worth noting that the basic legal 
framework concerning intellectual property in the United States is a century or more old and that some 
believe that current laws are becoming too strict. 
18 To all of these factors behind the U.S. ICT revolution might be added the large U.S. government 
expenditures over the past several decades associated with national defence and space research.  While 
much of this expenditure was motivated by the Cold War or simply the protection of such a large 
homeland, it fostered much cutting edge research.  For example, the method used to send data over the 
internet was pioneered in response to government funding to establish an emergency communication 
system.  Research originally directed towards space or defence applications in many cases proved useful 
and groundbreaking in other contexts or provided essential knowledge for progress in other fields of 
research. 
19 The importance of competition for productivity growth is echoed by MGI (2001), although it is 
suggested there that the operative channel is not necessarily through inducing ICT diffusion, but rather that 
ICT adoption is just one effect of competition that has the effect of increasing productivity.   40
  Sharpe (2004a) identifies a labour productivity growth acceleration in the U.S. 
business sector after 2000 that is distinct and in addition to that of the post-1995 period.  
This is unexpected, given the recession in 2001 and the general stagnation or collapse of 
much of the high-tech enthusiasm of the late 1990s.  Sharpe (2004a) and Sharpe, Rao and 
Smith (2005) discuss the probable factors behind this post-2000 acceleration in detail.  
One explanation they suggest is that, even as the adoption of ICT tailed off, the 
effectiveness with which the ICT were used in the workplace and in production processes 
continued to increase, so that the overall effect of ICT was only realized with a lag.  In 
other words, organizational practices and production processes were being reformed in 
response to ICT, although these reforms may not have been high-tech in nature.  The 
increase in the effectiveness of ICT use may also have been facilitated by the increased 
qualifications of workers, especially in the form of workplace training to fine-tune the 
skills of highly qualified workers. 
 
  The authors also suggest that cost pressures continued to be present for U.S. 
businesses after 2000 and especially after the recession of 2001, and in the absence of 
newer ICT, more traditional cost-cutting mechanisms were pursued.  One such 
mechanism is the outsourcing of peripheral operations to low-cost countries who have a 
competitive advantage in such activities, but it is also possible that ICT have allowed 
cost-cutting to take new forms within the United States.  Whatever particular mechanisms 
have been pursued, cost-cutting behaviour is certainly evident in a surge in corporate 
profits as a proportion of national income after 2000. 
 
  The authors mention several other possible factors behind the post-2000 U.S. 
labour productivity growth acceleration, including: increasing capital intensity due to 
extremely low interest rates, although interest rates have been increasing since the middle 
of 2004; generally strong short-term macroeconomic conditions (i.e. rapid output growth 
driven by strong consumer demand); and possible favourable changes to the composition 
of the workforce, such as through increased skills.  They also mention the possibility that 
some of the acceleration may be due to measurement error related to quality adjustment 
and the preliminary nature of some data, although they do not speculate that this is a 
particularly important factor. 
 
4)  Conclusion 
 
  In short, the United States economy possesses just about all of the virtues that are 
typically associated with improving productivity growth.  In this sense, there is much to 
learn from the U.S. experience, although several questions remain, first of all as to how 
these numerous factors came precisely together to create the phenomenal productivity 
success since the mid 1990s, and second as to whether these factors could produce such 
productivity success if transplanted to other countries. 
 
  While much research still remains to be done on these questions of coordination, 
it is tempting to suggest that the intense competition and strong market forces present in 
the United States have been responsible for or have at least played a facilitating role in 
the development of the many factors that have proven crucial for the U.S. productivity   41
growth resurgence.  Such competition attracts the brightest talent to the country, gives a 
strong incentive to commercialize the knowledge produced by that talent, and ensures a 
large market for such successful innovations as firms adopt them as part of their 
comprehensive and ongoing efficiency improvement efforts.  However, while 
competition may have been the integral ingredient bringing all of these positive factors 
together in the United States, it is unclear whether such an ingredient exists that would 
ensure success in Canada and other countries. 
 
B.  Ireland 
 
  Since the 1990s, the economic performance of the Irish Republic has been 
exceptional. Its per capita income (measured by real GDP divided by the total population) 
increased by 97 per cent between 1989 and 2000, almost doubling in 11 years (Fortin, 
2001). Over that period, Ireland had by far the best performance of all OECD countries. 
The Irish standard of living has now outstripped the UK level and the European average. 
 
  Generally, there are two basic ways to create more income per working-age adult: 
(1) by increasing productivity; and (2) by increasing the employment rate. Fortin (2001) 
breaks down the trend in Irish real GDP per working-age adult into its productivity and 
employment rate components, and finds that the Irish economic boom is an outcome of 
the winning combination of a long-term increase in productivity and a short-term 
employment boom. 
 
  Ireland’s productivity performance over the past forty years has been very good 
by international standards, coinciding with the opening up of the economy from the late 
1950s.  The growth in Irish productivity has averaged 3.3 per cent per year since 1976. 
This is a rare occurrence in the post-war period among OECD member countries, 
particularly over the last quarter century.  Its output per worker now exceeds that of most 
other industrial countries, and is beginning to challenge U.S. productivity levels. 
 
  At the same time, the extraordinary income growth performance of Ireland in 
recent years also stems from a dramatic turnaround in employment. The employment 
boom has seen the number of jobs expand by 44 per cent since 1993, and the 
unemployment rate decline from double digits to less than 5 per cent. Therefore, the Irish 
higher economic growth during the period can be explained by improvements in both 
labour productivity and labour utilization.  
 
  However, for a mature economy, productivity developments are the key to future 
growth potential. As is well known, when an economy is operating at close to full 
employment conditions, the potential for further growth from this source is inevitably 
more limited. In contrast, a broader scope for development can be achieved through 
introducing better technologies, providing better education and training, or putting in 
place better public infrastructure and high-quality machinery and equipment. Indeed, the 
acceleration of Irish structural productivity growth, which has contributed to the 
economic boom over the past decade, has been the key factor in improving Irish 
economic performance.   42
 
  The rapid Irish productivity growth over forty years was not driven by only one 
single factor.  According to Cassidy (2004), the main drivers behind the fast productivity 
growth during the period were: (1) the substantial foreign direct investment inflows from 
the United States; (2) the continuing shift of economic activity and employment from the 
primary sector to the secondary and tertiary sectors, especially the high-technology 
sectors including the chemical and the ICT sectors; (3) the availability of a young, 
relatively well-educated workforce; and (4) the increased European integration and 
increased subsidies from the European Union. 
 
  Economists believe that economic policy can have a central role in determining 
the productivity potential of an economy. This is especially true when we review Irish 
policy development over the past fifty years.  
 
  Irish public policy has been very active in promoting economic growth since the 
1950s.  Its main strategy has three components: 
 
•  promote free trade and monetary integration; 
 
•  develop a regulatory environment favourable to business and entrepreneurship; 
and 
 
•  provide free secondary and post-secondary education. 
 
  To better interpret the Irish long-term productivity development and to better 
understand the important role played by Irish economic policy, it is necessary to review 
in detail Ireland’s policy strategy in such key areas as commercial policy, tax policy, 
industrial policy, innovation policy, and education policy. 
 
1)  Free Trade and Monetary Integration 
 
  Ireland located is on a small island, and has a relatively small population of 3.8 
million. The geographic and demographic characteristics make it impossible to achieve 
an outstanding economic development with only its own resources. Thus Ireland has had 
to obtain wide access to external markets and to make its domestic economy competitive 
by exposing it to import competition. Ireland believes in great openness and considers it 
the only way for a small economy to expand and prosper. Therefore, the past forty years 
have seen the implementation of a series of policies to improve openness. 
 
  First, from the 1950s onward, Irish commercial policy became an ardent and 
consistent promoter of free trade and monetary integration. This early abandonment of 
protectionist policies led Ireland into the European Union in 1973, the European 
Monetary System in 1979, the Single European Market in 1993, and the European   43
Monetary Union in 1999. Recently, Ireland’s export-to-GDP ratio
20 exceeds 85 per cent, 
the corresponding ratio for Canada is only half as large (Fortin, 2001). Openness to trade 
and foreign investment has a catalytic effect on technological diffusion and innovation, 
which is mostly where long-run productivity growth comes from (Coe and Helpman, 
1995). 
 
  Second, Irish industrial policy has also been an early supporter of greater 
openness to international investment. By repealing the Control of Manufactures Act in 
1958, Ireland switched from a protectionist economy to a very liberal regime toward 
foreign direct investment by the early 1970s. As a result of this evolution, Ireland now 
has a very welcoming attitude toward foreign investment and has built a generous system 
of capital grants. Moreover, it ended the restrictions on multinational corporations to 
remit profits abroad. No country had such a liberal regime toward foreign direct 
investment during the 1970s. Thus Ireland became one of the most attractive regions for 
international investments, particularly for those from U.S. multinational corporations.
21 
 
  Third, Irish tax policy has been strongly supportive of free trade and monetary 
integration for several decades. The 1950s saw the introduction of a preferential rate of 
corporate taxation on profits from exports and manufacturing activity. This was replaced 
in the 1980s by the 10 per cent corporate tax rate on profits from manufacturing and 
internationally traded services, and from activities located in the international financial 
services centre in Dublin. In 2003, Ireland began to apply a single corporate profit tax of 
12.5 per cent to the entire corporate sector. The support to foreign direct investment 
provided by tax policy is the real and important factor in sustaining the long-term 
international investment inflow, which in turn is a strong driver of long-term productivity 
growth. 
 
2)  Business-friendly Environment 
 
Business activity flourishes more in a rules-based, transparent and business-
friendly environment than in a discretionary, arbitrary and non-friendly environment. 
Irish commercial, industrial and tax policies have taken a generally positive attitude 
toward business. These policies have been successful in attempting to create a regulatory 
environment favourable to business and entrepreneurship. The implications of business-
friendly policies include the following: 
 
•  Greater efficiency in administration – through quickly responding to business 
queries and needs, removing the restrictions on choice of business locations and 
use of profits, reducing regulation and administrative barriers and providing stable 
                                                  
20 The export-GDP ratio is the ratio of the total value of a nation’s exports to the total value of the nation’s 
GDP. Because exports are partially, fully or more than offset by imports in the calculation of GDP, the 
value of this ratio can exceed 100 per cent.  
21 Two more factors contributed to the large inflow of U.S. multinational corporations into Ireland in this 
period: first, U.S. investors liked the English-speaking environment there; and second, U.S. investors 
considered Ireland the best platform providing access to the EU.    44
and transparent rules – ensures that firms can access resources quickly, and also 
decreases administrative costs.  
    
•  Greater competition in both domestic and international market, by fostering a 
more efficient and flexible environment, can enable firms to achieve higher 
productivity growth through encouraging specialization, increasing R&D 
expenditures, employing more ICT and new equipment, and strengthening 
innovative capacities. 
 
•  Better public infrastructure – especially adequate international transportation, 
roads, and energy and telecommunications infrastructure – support business 
activities in the global market by decreasing transaction costs, thereby increasing 
productivity. 
 
•  A flexible labour market, by allowing for a more efficient allocation of existing 
labour resources, can help ensure that expanding businesses in innovative sectors 
can be matched with appropriately skilled workers. 
 
  Ireland’s manufacturing sector has benefited greatly from the business-friendly 
environment generated by these policies. According to the OECD, Ireland’s exceptional 
performance was driven mainly by developments in the manufacturing sector. And 
Ireland’s superior productivity performance in manufacturing has been largely a 
consequence of two factors. One factor is the higher productivity growth in the high-
technology sectors than the European average. Another factor is the greater degree of 
specialization in these sectors.
22 These sectors include chemicals, publishing and printing 
(which includes manufacture of software products) and electrical and optical equipment 
(essentially ICT products).  
 
3)  Effective Education Policy 
 
  Educational attainment is a key determinant of human capital, which is an 
important driver of labour productivity. Increasing an economy’s skill base can also have 
a positive impact on total factor productivity growth by facilitating structural change and 
technological improvements. 
 
  Education is also an important variable in terms of attracting inward foreign direct 
investment flows, which is particularly important for small open economies like Ireland. 
Internationally mobile capital always seeks high education environments as well as other 
factors such as favourable tax structures, a competitive cost base and low regulation. 
Ireland has effectively achieved the combination of all of these factors, and has seen an 
improvement in its productivity growth rate as a result. 
 
                                                  
22 However, it should be noted that Ireland has a low R&D intensity by international standards. Even in the 
high-tech sectors, the share of R&D expenditures is very small. Honohan and Walsh (2002) discuss this 
issue.   45
  Two factors have contributed to the high level of educational attainment in 
Ireland’s labour force.  First, from the 1960s onward, Irish education policy has been to 
provide free secondary and post-secondary education. As a result, Ireland has a high 
share of its population having completed higher education. Indeed, OECD data indicate 
that the share of the population that has completed post-secondary education in Ireland is 
the highest among the EU countries and not far below that of the United States. Ireland 
also ranks well in terms of science and engineering graduates.  A recent European 
Commission report placed Ireland highest in terms of the number per thousand of 
population, among 12 countries including the United States, United Kingdom and the 
larger European countries (Cassidy, 2004).  The performance of Irish students in 
international comparisons of proficiency in mathematics is also significantly above 
average. 
 
  Second, compared to foreign educational systems, the Irish educational system 
generally supports shorter, more practical courses. Since the traditional university 
approach is to provide more conceptual and abstract courses to students, it sometimes 
takes a relatively long time for new graduates to adapt themselves to firms’ requirements. 
The more applied nature of some post-secondary courses in Ireland has been instrumental 
in making Irish domestic firms more productive and in attracting multinational 
corporations to Ireland.  
 
  As Fortin (2001) points out, there was one negative consequence of rising levels 
of education in Ireland when its economy fell into depression before the 1990s, since lots 
of well-educated and highly skilled young Irish chose to emigrate. But when employment 
prospects brightened in early 1990s, these young workers came back to the Irish labour 
market again and have provided solid support for Irish productivity growth.  
 
  Skilled workers play a key role in the development and implementation of new 
technologies. Education can also act as a force against rising inequality in the knowledge-
intensive economy. Ireland’s experience provides a feasible example for other countries 
to improve labour quality and productivity through educational reform. 
 
4)  Lessons from Irish Productivity Growth 
 
  The Irish economic boom provides other countries with many lessons. With most 
of its economic growth taking place in the last twelve years, the economic miracle has 
two dimensions: one is a continuing rapid long-term increase in productivity (output per 
worker); and another is a short-term employment improvement. However, the long-term 
productivity growth plays a key role for Irish potential economic growth. And the causes 
of this productivity growth have important policy implications for other countries 
pursuing productivity improvement.  
 
  In sum, Irish commercial, industrial, tax and education policies have been very 
supportive of the rapid pace of long-term productivity growth. This strong and consistent 
support is not recent, but began to develop in the 1950s and matured in the 1970s. The 
goals of these policies included but were not limited to the promotion of greater openness   46
to foreign trade and investment, the development of a business-friendly environment, and 
the provision of a highly skilled labour force. The right policies eventually paid off.
23  
 
  More specifically, the continuing Irish productivity growth implies three main 
lessons related to economic policies, namely that such policies should be directed 
towards: 
 
•  increasing openness to international markets and promoting free trade and 
monetary integration; 
 
•  maintaining macroeconomic stability and fostering a culture supportive of 
enterprises; and 
 
•  promoting and supporting formal education and encouraging lifelong learning 
within the workforce. 
 
C.  Australia  
 
  Australia and Canada have similar economies. They both are relatively small 
economies and have similar economic structures. During the 1990s, Australia was an 
outstanding economic performer among leading economic nations in the world. Its real 
growth per capita averaged above 4 per cent per year, outperforming Canada, and this 
was driven by real advances in productivity, rather than simply catching up from a low 
productivity baseline.   
 
  According to Harchaoui et al. (2003), Australia’s rapid productivity growth 
during the post-1995 period was mostly due to more capital deepening and, to a lesser 
extent, higher multifactor productivity. Canada’s productivity growth rate gap with 
Australia arose partly because investment in Canada grew less rapidly than in Australia. 
In contrast, labour increased more rapidly in Canada than in Australia. As a result, the 
rate of increase in capital per hour worked – the key factor behind labour productivity 
growth – increased more slowly in Canada. 
 
  Australia’s ability to grow so strongly, even in the midst of economic challenges 
such as the Asian financial crisis, has led some to label Australia as the “miracle” 
economy. However, according to Parham (2002), this was no miracle. The productivity 
surge was certainly remarkable, but it was also “predictable.” 
 
  There are several drivers of this success behind Australia’s outstanding economic 
performance. Gans and Stern (2003) point out that relative macroeconomic stability and a 
substantial modernization of the tax system contributed to this substantial level of 
achievement.  However, the policy reform in Australia that has “fostered a transition to 
                                                  
23 It should, however, be noted that productivity growth and welfare improvements are not always 
correlated.  Hubert (2005) points out that Ireland’s remarkable productivity growth since 1989 has been 
paralleled by a 50% rise in alcohol consumption. To counter this phenomenon, he suggests that the 
government should urge the drinks industry to discourage youth from drinking.   47
more competitive, open, flexible, innovative and resilient economy” has been particularly 
important to promote productivity growth (Parham, 2000). 
 
  Parham believes that the approach of the reforms was not to attempt to raise 
productivity growth via a targeted or industry-specific strategy.  Rather, the approach was 
largely to release the shackles that had previously restricted productivity growth and to 
pursue social objectives through more targeted and less distortionary instruments. 
 
  The policy reforms mainly included but were not limited to: deregulation of 
access to finance; floating the currency; marked reductions in barriers to trade and 
foreign direct investment; commercialization (and some privatization) of government 
business enterprises; strengthening competition policy; enhancement of public utilities in 
key infrastructure areas such as telecommunications and energy; and enabling greater 
labour market flexibility.  
 
  Australia began to introduce these reforms in the mid 1980s and continued to 
apply them throughout the 1990s. But implementation of policies does not come into 
effect overnight. According to the McKinsey Global Institute’s evaluation in 1995 (MGI, 
1995a), Australia’s economic reforms did little to improve its relative performance at that 
time. However, the post-1995 period saw Australia’s  high rate of growth in productivity. 
Indeed, it is believed that Australia has only just begun to feel the impact of these reforms 
on productivity, and reform-driven growth can continue in the long term.   
 
  Among those drivers that promote Australia’s efficiency gains, three policy-
related factors have been given particular attention. 
 
•  Sharper competition – through lower trade and foreign investment barriers and 
domestic deregulation and pro-competition regulation –“has provided greater 
incentives for business to improve productivity by seeking out more value-adding 
products and new markets and by reducing costs” (Parham, 2002). The reform of 
public sector services has improved efficiency and has especially benefited 
businesses.   
 
•  The promotion of innovation – through encouraging rigorous domestic 
competition and establishing strong protection of intellectual property – has 
transformed Australia from an adopter to a producer of global technology. The 
development of a national innovation system, which includes a common 
innovation infrastructure, the cluster-specific environment and the quality of 
linkages (Gans and Stern, 2003), has strengthened Australia’s innovative capacity 
and stimulated the development even of traditional industries such as wine and 
agriculture. 
 
•  Businesses are able to adjust production and distribution processes more flexibly, 
due to a newly-established ability to negotiate work arrangements at the enterprise 
level, rather than relying on arrangements imposed through centralized  “one-size-
fits-all” bargaining. The greater flexibility in the labour market has provided the   48
workforce with a greater incentive to invest in education and training, which in 
turn has influenced productivity growth positively. The greater openness 
accompanied with greater flexibility has encouraged greater specialization and 
has provided easier access to up-to-date technology and know-how. 
 
  In order to understand Australia’s productivity surge in the 1990s and learn 
lessons from its success to promote Canada’s labour productivity, special attention should 
be given to Australia’s experience with ICT, its labour market, and the innovation 
system. 
 
1)  An Industry Perspective on Productivity and ICT  
 
  A small number of industries was largely responsible for Australia’s productivity 
surge in the 1990s. Wholesale trade made the largest contribution to the strong labour 
productivity growth. Construction and finance and insurance are stand-out performers as 
well.  At first, the productivity acceleration in some of the service industries, particularly 
wholesale trade, seems surprising and unrelated to policy reform. Closer examination, 
however, reveals the importance of some of the reform-related mechanisms discussed 
above. In short, these industries have benefited greatly from openness to trade and 
investment and from competition with foreign and domestic counterparts.  
 
  As part of Australia’s “modernization”, information and communications 
technologies (ICT) appear to have contributed significantly to the transition to a more 
competitive, open and flexible economy in the 1990s. The Australian market for ICT 
goods and services was $77.5 billion in 2000-01, almost trebling since 1992-93.
24 Indeed, 
ICT have made a large contribution to the acceleration in labour productivity growth in 
Australia through increasing capital deepening, as they have done in other OECD 
countries. 
 
  There was very little in the way of policy strategy to encourage ICT uptake. 
Moreover, much of the increased use of ICT in the 1990s has been offset by slower 
growth in the use of other forms of capital. ICT-productivity links are strongest in 
distribution, financial intermediation and business services. These industries are more 
intensive ICT users and have shown stronger productivity accelerations.  
 
  Productivity gains were generated through process and product innovation, both 
of which were enabled through ICT use. The finance and insurance industry has been 
restructured to operate much more through ICT than through traditional face-to-face 
contacts. Australian banks, in particular, have been able to support strong growth in 
output, with quite major reductions in the number of branches and employees. A study 
also found that ICT played a part in the restructuring of wholesaling activities (Parham, 
Roberts and Sun, 2001). For example, bar coding and scanning of products, initially 
introduced by grocery retailers, became widespread in the wholesale trade sector in the 
1990s. By enabling accurate electronic records to be kept of products all along the supply 
                                                  
24 Mapping Australian Science and Innovation, “Business Innovation Working Paper”, retrieved from   
http://www.dest.gov.au/mapping/pubs/bgd_papers/innovation.pdf.   49
chain, this technology has reduced inventory levels, the amount of time goods need to be 
handled, as well as the response times of wholesalers to the demands of their customers. 
 
  Therefore, policy reforms acted as the underlying drivers and facilitators of 
productivity gains, and ICT were just one component of change. As businesses became 
more flexible and competitive pressures increased, ICT became part of a general process 
of restructuring and transformation.  In this sense, it is not important for Australia to 
become an ICT producer and master up-to-date technology. As a smart user of ICT, 
Australia has enjoyed a sizeable terms of trade gain due to the rapid declines in ICT 
prices. 
 
2)  Labour Market Flexibility and Proficiency Gains 
 
  Increased labour market flexibility has also played a role in Australia’s 
productivity improvement. A shift from a highly centralized labour market under the 
Accord arrangements of the 1980s to a greater emphasis on enterprise bargaining has 
given individual firms the incentives to restructure their labour forces to improve 
productivity and more flexibly respond to changing circumstances. The introduction of 
split shifts and reduced rigidity of job demarcations between different occupational 
groups has improved opportunities for business operators to meet the competitive 
challenges from the domestic and foreign market.  
 
  A more educated and high-skilled workforce associated with labour market 
flexibility has also likely been one of the main contributors to Australia’s productivity 
surge. Secondary school retention rates and tertiary participation have increased in 
Australia, particularly among females, over the last two decades. 
 
  Increased skills can influence productivity growth in two ways. First, skills can 
directly raise the productivity of workers. Second, in line with endogenous growth 
theory, a more educated and experienced workforce can promote the uptake and further 
development of advanced technologies. Relatively high skills in the Australian 
workforce, for example, are likely to have played a part in the rapid uptake of ICT. The 
influence of skills on the rates of absorption of technology and innovation warrants 
further investigation.  
 
3)  The Innovation System and Productivity Growth 
 
  In a global economy, innovation-based competitiveness provides a more stable 
foundation for productivity growth than the traditional emphasis on low-cost production. 
Gans and Stern (2003) point out that the important gains that Australia has made in 
innovative capacity throughout the 1990s have been the key drivers of rapid productivity 
growth, and that the real concern for Australia’s long-term prosperity lies in innovative 
performance. 
 
  During the 1980s, Australia could be characterized as a “classical” imitator 
economy.  That is, productivity improvements were primarily driven by the ability to   50
import technology and ideas developed elsewhere. Over the past decade, Australia has 
more than doubled its level of innovative capacity (relative to its levels in the early 
1980s) and transformed itself into a second-tier innovator economy.  Gans and Stern 
believe that this improvement has been the result of the following policy-relevant factors: 
 
•  Australia has maintained a high share of national income devoted to higher 
education and university R&D performance. Indeed, these investments in a 
research-oriented educational sector were the stepping stones upon which the 
improvement in Australian innovative capacity was founded. 
 
•  As an important consequence of key reforms to Australia’s competition policy, 
increasing openness and other factors made Australia an attractive location for 
foreign investment after 1990. The strengthened competition has given domestic 
firms greater incentive to invest in R&D departments and promote innovations. 
 
•  Proactive policy changes in intellectual property protection and other areas 
improved the perception of how conducive the Australian environment was to 
innovation. Australia has secured a position as a leading user of global technology 
by creating an innovative and politically stable environment. 
 
  Together, a record of sound macroeconomic policy, microeconomic reform and 
openness, and an enhanced R&D workforce all contributed to Australia’s ability to 
achieve second-tier innovator status by the mid-1990s.  
 
  With a decade of structural reforms and with continued operational improvement 
in education and infrastructure now a given, Australian companies are able to rapidly 
acquire and deploy technology from around the world. Perhaps the wine industry in 
Australia provides a good example of visible innovative clusters. Though it has only 
recently emerged as a leading force in the international market, the growth of Australia’s 
wine industry is the consequence of decades of investment, from the establishment of the 
Australia Wine Research Institute in 1955 to the flurry of institutions for collaboration on 
international markets founded over the past decade. 
 
  Achieving a higher level of innovative capacity requires attention to all aspects of 
the innovation system. Australia’s experience illustrates the importance of the availability 
of a world-class pool of highly skilled people, an investment environment that 
encourages the deployment of risk capital, and a policy that encourages vigorous 
domestic competition and strong protection of intellectual property. As a result of these 
factors, the innovation system has played a key role for Australia’s productivity growth 
and will continue to sustain Australia’s evolution towards a first-tier innovation economy.  
 
4)  Conclusion 
 
  Australia experienced a resurgence of productivity growth in the 1990s. The fact 
that most other OECD countries did not share this experience suggests that domestic 
factors must have played an important role in this resurgence (Parham, 2004). According   51
to the studies reviewed above, policy reforms that were introduced in the mid 1980s have 
been major drivers and enablers of Australia’s impressive productivity performance.  
 
  Policy reforms in Australia have enhanced competitive pressures; opened the 
economy to trade, investment and technology; raised investment in R&D; and 
encouraged firms to become more flexible in terms of adjusting all aspects of production, 
distribution and marketing. On top of these foundations, the widespread use of ICT, the 
increased labour market flexibility and the strengthened national innovative capacity have 
been specific factors driving the remarkable productivity growth. 
 
D.  United Kingdom 
 
1)  The UK’s Productivity Growth: the Drivers and the Barriers 
 
The growth record of the UK economy for much of the 20
th century has been 
disappointing.  Its performance between 1960 and 1980 was particularly dismal relative 
to that of other countries.  In 1960, real GDP per capita in the UK stood at a similar level 
to that of West Germany’s and was 15 per cent higher than that of France (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2000). By 1979, real GDP per capita in the UK was 12 per cent less than 
that of France, 15 per cent less than that of Germany and one-third less than that of the 
United States.  Over the next two decades, the growth performance of the UK was 
somewhat mixed as it managed to make up some lost ground.  By 1998, real GDP per 
capita in the UK was 11 per cent less than that in Germany and 3 per cent less than that of 
France.  In part, this catch up was due to the poor performance of these two economies as 
the gap in real GDP per capita between the UK and US widened slightly from 32 to 34 
per cent. 
 
Growth in real GDP per capita is driven by a combination of growth in 
employment and the productivity of labour.  The labour market in the UK has performed 
well with respect to employment growth over the 1980s and 1990s and has one of the 
lowest unemployment rates among the G-7 economies (HM Treasury and DTI, 2004). 
The strong performance of the labour market in the UK suggests that the continued 
income differential is due to lower labour productivity.   
 
The UK’s labour productivity gap with France and Germany has varied over the 
course of the post-war period.  Before 1979, labour productivity growth in the UK was 
one per cent per year slower than that for Germany or France.  The timing of the 
disappearance of this growth rate differential after 1979 coincides with the economic 
reforms enacted by the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership.  
These reforms sought to reduce government intervention in labour and product markets 
and increase the efficiency with which they operated, two measures that fostered 
productivity gains observed over the next two decades (Card and Freeman, 2002)  
Evidence of the market-oriented nature of these reforms comes from the change in UK’s 
ranking with respect to measures of competitiveness and “market friendliness”.  In the 
late 1970s, several of these indices ranked the UK in the middle of a group consisting of 
other Western economies.  By the late 1990s, the UK stood at or near to the top of several   52
of these indices and in some cases ranked ahead of the US.  Thus, economic reforms in 
the UK over the past 20 years appear to have yielded benefits in the form of higher 
productivity growth and halted the relative decline in living standards, at least with 
respect to France and Germany. 
 
2)  Economic Reforms: the Main Drivers of Productivity Growth 
 
  What UK policy reforms helped to halt the relative decline in labour productivity 
and raise its growth rate?  Card and Freeman (2002:48) identify 3 reforms in particular 
that have promoted growth in labour productivity over the past two decades.  These are 
listed as follows: 
 
l  Reductions in trade union power. This has increased labour market flexibility, 
promoted competition among workers and made it easier to implement and 
reform labour market regulation. These policies also successfully increased the 
freedom of business to manage its workplace.  Each of these measures has growth 
promoting effects.   
 
l  Privatization of state-owned industries.  Privatization has raised labour 
productivity of the UK economy as a whole as industries and firms were made 
more responsive to market conditions and shed excess labour. 
 
l  Creation of incentives for self-employment and share ownership of firms.  The 
creation of share ownership plans aligned the incentives of the firm with that of 
the workers.  Workers now had a direct stake in the success of their firms which 
has a direct consequence of their productivity.  Self-employment did not promote 
higher labour productivity as much as policy makers had desired but it did let 
individuals who may have had a comparative advantage in terms of generating 
successful self-employment opportunities separate themselves out from other 
types of workers. 
 
How did each of these three measures contribute to higher labour productivity 
growth?  The empirical evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
productivity and the presence of collective bargaining (Pencavel, 2002). In the post-war 
period, the growth of unions in the UK was widespread.  By 1980 over 50 per cent of 
wage and salaried workers belonged to a union. The Thatcher government enacted a 
series of reforms with the Employment Acts of 1980, 1982 and 1984 that were designed 
to reduce the power of trade unions. These Acts substantially reduced government 
support for unions and their collective bargaining rights.  By 1999, union membership 
had fallen to 30 per cent of the workforce.  The prevalence of multiple unions in the same 
workplace, which was commonplace prior to 1980 and introduced significant obstacles to 
labour productivity growth, was also reduced
 (Card and Freeman, 2002:48). Together, 
these reforms reduced union power and increased the labour market flexibility, promoting 
labour productivity growth. 
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  Privatization of state-owned firms, which came to be a hallmark of the Thatcher 
government, also made a significant contribution to labour productivity growth. State 
ownership blunted incentives for firms to reduce costs and increase productivity created 
by competitive pressures present in the marketplace.  State ownership also left firms open 
to political interference and a lack of funds for investment as they frequently operated at 
a loss and proved to be a drain on public funds.  A substantial proportion of the economy 
was affected by privatization.  In 1979, state-owned industries accounted for over 10 per 
cent of gross domestic product in UK.  By the end of the 1990s, the per centage had 
fallen to 2 per cent.  
 
  One way to gauge the effects of privatization on productivity is to examine price 
changes across industries.  An investigation conducted by the UK National Audit Office 
indicated significant price changes occurred in those sectors that underwent privatization 
and this resulted from productivity gains (Marshall, 2000). Exposure to increased 
competition after privatization was the key factor differentiating price changes in sectors 
from those where it was associated with stagnation or declines in productivity relative to 
private firms or international benchmarks.  For instance, by 1996, electricity prices had 
fallen by nearly 20 per cent, gas prices by 40 per cent, and telephone prices had more 
than halved (all in real terms), in contrast to water and sewerage bills that had nearly 
doubled for all customers. In sum, privatization coupled with the presence of competitive 
markets appears to have provided firms with sufficient incentives to increase their 
productivity.  
 
  Empirical evidence suggests that productivity is higher in firms that have some 
kind of share compensation scheme in place compared to those which do not.  
Consequently, the introduction and expansion of such programs under Thatcher’s 
Conservative government is thought to have raised labour productivity.  These reforms 
included arrangements for profit-sharing, profit-related pay, save-as-you-earn schemes 
and company stock option schemes.  In 1979, approximately one-quarter of workers in 
the UK were covered by such plans.  By 2002, the reforms had expanded the range of 
eligibility to include 45 per cent of the workforce. Freeman (2001) estimated that firms 
that implemented such measures improved their labour productivity by 12 per cent. 
 
  In sum, two decades of economic reforms have increased the market orientation 
of the UK economy relative to that of other advanced economies.  Through reductions in 
trade union power, privatization of publicly owned industries and introduction of share 
compensation plans, the UK has increased the number of people in employment and 
narrowed the productivity gap with international competitors. Consequently, labour 
productivity in the UK has risen by 55 per cent since 1979 and recorded an average 
annual growth rate of 1.9 per cent per year.   
 
 
   This growth record is no small achievement.  On an international basis, however, 
the performance of the UK looks less impressive. OECD data show that UK labour 
productivity still lagged behind most of its key overseas competitors in 2002.  On the 
basis of output per worker, productivity was almost 40 per cent higher in the US, 11 per   54
cent higher in France, 4 per cent higher in Germany and marginally higher in Japan.  The 
next section will examine explanations for the persistent productivity gap between the 
UK and its international counterparts.   
 
3)  The UK’s International Productivity Gap: An Explanation 
 
  The definitive reason for why the UK has lagged behind its international 
competitors remains elusive.  In reality, the explanation is likely to consist of a set of 
explanations. Three explanations in particular have been identified by those who have 
studied the gap.  They are listed as follows: 
 
l  Under-investment in education. The failure to provide sufficient numbers of well-
educated and highly skilled workers to industries has limited the development of 
the UK economy’s capacity to innovate.  In turn, this has reduced the potential for 
productivity growth. 
 
l  Low rate of ICT diffusion. Low rates of ICT usage has led to reduced 
opportunities for firms and organizations to compete with their international 
counterparts through cutting prices or providing fast and efficient service.  This 
has exacerbated the UK’s “skill shortage”.  
 
l  Excessive government regulation. Despite earlier efforts at reform, regulations 
still prevent labour and goods markets from being truly competitive.  There still 
exist barriers to entry or expansion by best-practice operators.  These barriers also 
hinder the adoption of best-practice techniques and reduce the competitive 
pressure on industry participants to raise their productivity.  
 
  Why do these three reasons matter for the explanation of the gap?  The link 
between high levels of educational attainment and the productivity of workers is firmly 
established.  Even at a basic level, however, the UK seems to experience problems.  
Many international comparisons of numeracy and literacy put the UK near the bottom of 
the list in relation to its international competitors.  A 1998 survey indicated that a far 
lower proportion of the UK workforce holds post-secondary qualifications than in 
Germany and France (Millar, 2005). Despite 11 years of compulsory education, about 
25,000 pupils left school at 16 without a single GCSE to their name in 2004, and 
approximately four and a half million people had no qualifications at all.  Successive 
generations of policy-makers have been aware of deficiencies in education and training, 
but have failed to rectify them. 
 
  The UK has also failed to develop an adequate system of vocational education 
and on-the-job training.  Many businesses in UK experience skill shortages and are 
unable to recruit the adequately skilled individuals from the labour market that they need. 
In 2004, 135,000 vacancies could not be filled because of skill shortages. Other 
businesses suffer from skills gaps, whereby some of their employees lack the skills that 
they need to carry out their jobs effectively (Millar, 2005).  Higher skill levels also allow 
workers to generate new ideas and adapt to the changing economic environment.  As a   55
result, the UK’s low level of human capital relative to other countries acts as a brake on 
its economic performance.  
 
  Skilled workers are only productive in the presence of capital and the link 
between ICT usage and economic growth is strong in developed economies.  The slow 
rate of ICT diffusion in the UK has led to a low level of ICT capital and makes a strong 
contribution towards its productivity gap.  Notaro (2004) points out that the weaker 
output and labour productivity growth in the UK is due to a growth rate of ICT capital 
that is lower than other countries.  The ICT industry itself and its diffusion has a positive 
effect on labour productivity by providing a demand for and training high skilled 
workers.     
 
Evidence on the connection between ICT usage, the shortage of skilled workers 
and the UK’s poor productivity performance comes from Mason and O’Mahony (2004).  
They find that the level of ICT usage was low in the presence of a skills shortage.  In 
turn, they observed that rapidly changing skill requirements occasioned by the use of ICT 
helped to create these skill shortages.  This went hand-in-hand with the under-investment 
in education and training on the part of individuals and government.  The slow rate of 
diffusion of ICT that results from this feedback effect also acts to worsen the problem 
since it lowers the demand for highly skilled workers.   
 
Government regulation of product markets and land use form the third reason why 
the international productivity gap exists.  These regulations influence competitive 
behaviour, investment and pricing and preclude faster productivity growth.  This was the 
conclusion from a report by the McKinsey Global Institute (1998) on UK productivity:  
 
This conclusion may seem counterintuitive to many; after all, the United 
Kingdom is widely perceived as having a relatively deregulated and open 
economy. Indeed, that is the case in the areas of labour regulation and capital 
market operation. However, in two other major areas, specific product market 
and land use regulations, the UK appears to have far more in common with its 
continental neighbors than with the more deregulated United States. 
 
  The study also shows that the reasons most frequently invoked for the United 
Kingdom’s economic underperformance such as low investment in education, poorly 
skilled management and operation and low capital investment, results from the presence 
of market restrictions. For instance, regulatory barriers that prevent the entry of new 
firms into markets protect low productivity firms.  As a result, labour and capital that 
would otherwise be associated with those higher productivity firms will seek out business 
opportunities outside of the UK. A study by Haskel et al. (2004) shows that foreign-
owned multinational firms typically have higher productivity.  Consequently, government 
regulations that reduce the level of competition in market can partly account for the UK’s 
productivity gap.  
 
4)  Conclusion 
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  The UK economy has lagged behind its international competitors in terms of real 
GDP per capita since 1979.  Lower labour productivity in the UK has been responsible 
for this gap.  In response to this productivity differential, successive UK governments 
have adopted policies designed to move the economy back to “premier league” status.  
These policies included reductions in trade union power, privatization of publicly-owned 
industries and introduction of share compensation plans.  Together, these reforms have 
increased the employment rate and helped narrow the productivity gap. 
 
  However, there still remain barriers to improving the UK’s productivity 
performance. These factors include: 1) low investment in education and training, 2) low 
rates of ICT diffusion, and 3) the continued presence of government regulation in specific 
goods market and land use.  These three barriers call for more investment in formal 
education and skill training, research and development, encouraging the development of 
the ICT industry and the diffusion of ICT, and continued efforts to deregulate domestic 
markets.  Such measures are necessary to reward entrepreneurship and encourage 
technological innovation that is the hallmark of modern economic growth.  
  
E.  Finland 
 
  Finland, a small country of five million people located far from the centre of 
Europe, has enjoyed great economic success in recent years. According to the OECD 
(2004b), the transformation of the Finnish economy over the last decade has been one of 
the few examples of the “new economy” taking hold in Europe. Output and productivity 
growth in the second half of the 1990s was among the highest in the OECD. 
 
1)  Finland: A High Tech Success Story 
 
  Finland is not only one of the EU leading producers of ICT (together with Ireland 
and Sweden), but also a prominent example of leap-frogging with respect to the rest of 
the OECD. Among OECD countries, it has made the most progress in the world ranking 
of IT producers since the early 1990s. 
   
  Finland since 1990 has gone from being a net importer to a net exporter of high-
tech goods. Indeed, Finland has the largest per capita surplus in foreign trade in 
communications equipment in the world. The Finnish ICT sector accounted for 15 per 
cent of the value of market production (10 per cent of GDP) in 2001, up from 8.0 per cent 
in 1995, 5.8 per cent in 1990, and 3.7 per cent in 1975.  
 
  Nokia is the leading Finnish company accounting for about one half of the overall 
IT contribution to aggregate value added, and 3.3 per cent of GDP. The firm accounts for 
one fourth of Finnish exports, one third of business R&D, and 5 per cent of 
manufacturing employment. Perhaps surprisingly, Nokia was until 1990 a conglomerate 
with many business lines.  The deep recession of the early 1990s propelled the firm’s 
leadership to re-orient toward electronics and drop other activities, with cell phones 
becoming the dominant product line. It is interesting to note that Nokia’s success has 
attracted much international venture capital to Finland in search of the “next Nokia.”    57
 
  The reasons why Finland has been so successful in exploiting new globally 
available technologies are still poorly understood. Lane (2004) has suggested the 
following factors: 
 
•  a university education system heavily oriented toward science and technology; 
 
•  high levels of R&D undertaken by both the business and non-business sectors; 
 
•  a focus on all aspects of IT products, with world leadership in both goods (Nokia 
cellphones) and services (Linux software); 
 
•  the early liberalization of the telcom sector; 
 
•  an historical lack of monopolization of the Finnish telephone network by the 
State, ensuring that competitive pressures to invest in R&D existed even before 
deregulation; and  
   
•  the liberalization of the financial sector, leading to better access to capital for IT 
start-ups. 
 
2)  The Impact of the Early 1990s Recession 
 
  Finland experienced a severe recession in the early 1990s, with output falling 
steeply between 1990 and 1992 and with unemployment rising to nearly 20 per cent. The 
causes of this recession included the abrupt loss of the Russian market linked to the 
collapse of the USSR, recession in other EU countries, the overheating of the Finnish 
economy in the late 1980s, a credit and banking crisis, and inappropriate policy response 
to deal with the financial crisis.
25 
 
  The crisis appears to have had a transformative effect on Finland, with a dynamic 
market economy emerging out of a highly regulated one. The existence of slack resources 
in the mid-1990s may have facilitated the factor reallocation and organizational 
restructuring that was required to effectively exploit new technological opportunities. 
According to Daveri and Silva (2004:129), two changes arising from the recession were 
critical from the point of view of productivity: markets took over from the State in 
allocating resources and the stock market took over from the banks in the allocation of 
credit. Capital was now used more efficiently, and many firms actually shed capital, 
resulting in a drop in the capital-labour ratio and considerably higher total factor 
productivity in certain sectors (Maliranta, 2001). Indeed, total factor productivity growth 
in the non-farm market sector averaged over 4 per cent per year after 1992, well above 
the 2.5 per cent rate of the 1976-92 period (Daveri and Silva, 2004:130, Table 3). 
 
                                                  
25 See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) for a detailed analysis of the causes of the Finnish economic crisis 
of the early 1990s.   58
3)  The Impact of a Strong IT-producing Sector on Productivity 
 
  Daveri and Silva (2004) find that Nokia, the world leader in cellular phone 
production, directly and substantially contributed to enhanced productivity growth in the 
Finnish ICT sector. However, productivity gains outside Nokia and a few other IT-related 
service industries have been small, temporary or short-lived, or non-existent. The authors 
find that not only has the scope of productivity gains been narrow in Finland, but what 
has been observed cannot be clearly ascribed to the technological champion in that 
country.  The authors consequently conclude (page 123) that “…even in a country 
endowed with a world-class national champion, the ‘new economy’ takes a long time to 
show up. And in contradiction to commonly held tenets in public debates, IT diffusion 
has shown a limited potential in speeding up this process in Finland.” 
 
  Daveri and Silva (2004) point to two pieces of evidence against the existence of 
technological spillovers between Nokia and other fast growing industries to other sectors. 
First, the thinness of the inter-industry linkages between Nokia and the rest of the 
economy indicates that productivity gains of the size recorded in the few fast growing 
service sectors can be associated to Nokia’s boom only to a very small extent. Second, 
industries with robust productivity gains were those characterized by large declines in the 
price of their machinery and equipment investment goods. Thus TFP gains in those 
industries should be largely attributed to the decline in the world price of computing 
power.  
 
  Finland is a prototypical small open economy with a leading exporting industry 
(Nokia) relatively unconnected in an input-output sense with the rest of the economy. It 
was not Nokia behind the productivity acceleration in IT-related services in Finland in 
the 1990s. Rather such industries benefited from worldwide technical change embodied 
in machinery and equipment. Consequently, the IT-usage hypothesis does not appear to 
be applicable to Finland’s new economy success since the mid-1990s. This raises the 
question of why IT diffusion did not materialize to a greater extent in Finland comparable 
to the important role it played in fostering productivity gains in the United States. Daveri 
and Silva (2004:153) speculate that EU-style protective labour market institutions may 
have hampered the necessary reallocation of resources from low to high productivity 
activities both across and within industries, slowing down the emergence of the new 
economy in Finland. This appears to have been especially the case in retail and wholesale 
distribution, key industries contributing to the U.S. productivity resurgence. This implies 
that the IT diffusion will not produce new economy growth unless accompanied by 
labour market flexibility.  
 
4)  The Finnish Labour Market and Productivity 
 
  The Finnish labour market has many of the characteristics of the Nordic model 
which some economists believe hinders productivity growth. Taxes on labour are high, 
wage differentials between low and high skilled workers are low, social benefits are 
generous, input from the labour market or social partners (i.e. business and labour) is 
highly valued, and collective bargaining is centralized. These features do not appear to   59
have seriously impeded (and may have even facilitated) Finland becoming a IT leader, 
but they may hurt future productivity growth.  
 
  As part of the EU’s Lisbon strategy, the Finnish government has the long-term 
objective of raising the employment rate to 75 per cent from the current 68 per cent 
figure.  The government’s approach to attaining this objective focuses mainly on cuts in 
labour taxation and improvements in and expansion of active labour market policies 
(ALMPs). It is unlikely that the expansion of ALMPs in isolation will have much effect 
on aggregate labour productivity outcomes, but the OECD (2004a:5) argues that the 
emphasis on ALMPs is welcome to the extent that it is conceived as part of a “mutual 
obligations” approach whereby effective re-employment services and benefits are 
provided to job-seekers, who in turn have to actively seek employment. Mutual 
obligation approaches are believed to create an environment conducive to productivity 
growth, as the “win-win” nature of productivity gains is recognized by all. 
 
  A higher employment rate requires addressing the issue of labour market 
mismatch, in turn linked to wage compression due to centralized wage agreements. 
Finland currently has a scarcity of jobs for the low skilled in the service sector and a high 
unemployment rate for the unskilled. There is discussion of introducing flexibility into 
the system of centralized wage determination through lead firm-level negotiations. This 
could provide scope for productivity and profit-related wage differentials. There are two 
implications for productivity growth from such a change. First, greater wage differentials 
may have a positive effect on productivity by providing workers with greater incentives 
to work. Second, the expansion of low wage, low skill jobs, while positive from the point 
of view of the employment rate, may lower productivity through a composition effect. 
Lower productivity from higher labour force participation of marginal workers is not a 
negative development from a societal perspective.       
 
5)  Conclusion 
 
  At least three major lessons can be gleaned from the Finnish productivity 
experience. First, a vibrant high-productivity growth ICT-producing sector does not 
necessarily diffuse robust productivity gains to non-ICT producing sectors, especially in a 
small open economy. Second, an above average performance on innovation indicators 
such as R&D does not necessarily translate into above average living standards. GDP per 
capita in Finland is still only close to the OECD median country despite its innovative 
economy. Third, robust productivity growth across all sectors requires adaptable labour 
market institutions, and innovative financial markets, and a workforce well trained in 
science and technology. The availability and diffusion of best practice technologies is a 
necessary condition, but by no means a sufficient condition for productivity advance.  
 
  As is the case for all economies, Finland faces a number of  mid- and long-term 
challenges. The OECD (OECD, 2004b:1) notes that the likelihood of smaller productivity 
gains in the ICT sector, a continuation of falling ICT prices, and mediocre performance in 
sheltered sectors, poses a threat to future living standards growth.     
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F.  Sweden 
 
  Sweden’s labour productivity growth experience in the 1980s and especially the 
1990s provides an interesting perspective on the factors associated with a successful 
productivity performance.  The Swedish manufacturing sector achieved world-class 
productivity growth in the 1990s, while the service sector, accounting for a much larger 
share of the economy, saw much slower labour productivity growth and little or no 
improvement in this regard relative to the 1980s.  This extremely asymmetrical 
performance affords the opportunity to attempt to identify both the factors behind the 
manufacturing sector’s success and the factors behind the rest of the economy’s less 
impressive performance. 
 
1)  The Importance of Competition 
 
  Two comprehensive studies of the Swedish economy – one by the McKinsey 
Global Institute (1995) and the other the most recent country survey by the OECD 
(2004d) – identify competition as a source of both the manufacturing sector’s rapid 
productivity growth and the poorer growth of service industries.  The McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI) states that, in the early 1990s, three quarters of the Swedish economy was 
sheltered from foreign competition.  Furthermore, while that three quarters of the 
economy has historically failed to innovate on a consistent basis and to adopt global best 
practice, industries like heavy vehicle manufacturing, computer software and the 
deregulated banking sector – all well integrated in the global economy and free of 
protective barriers – showed rapid productivity growth in the 1980s and had come to 
define the global productivity benchmark by the early 1990s. 
 
  MGI (1995) especially notes the outstanding productivity performance of the 
vehicle manufacturing industry from the late 1980s onwards, in which just two firms – 
Volvo and Scania – were able to achieve these productivity gains through intense 
competition with each other and in the global market.  Meanwhile, the Swedish banking 
industry was deregulated in the mid 1980s, and the domestic competition that this created 
gave banks an incentive to innovate in terms of creating new financial services and 
products.  By 1992, the Swedish banking industry had a higher productivity level than 
that in either Germany or the United Kingdom, and trailed only the United States. 
 
  On the other hand, MGI notes that the Swedish retail sector has long been 
hampered by protective zoning rules, and the construction industry by strict union work 
rules that stifle labour market competition.  Such strict work rules, which limit the 
specific tasks that a given worker is allowed to perform, were once present in the 
automotive manufacturing industry as well.  But the intense international competition 
faced by this industry motivated the unions and firms to come to an agreement on less 
restrictive rules, which allowed this industry to achieve impressive productivity gains and 
remain internationally competitive.  The Swedish public transportation industry has also 
had much productivity success, especially relative to the Netherlands, which MGI 
attributes in part to more flexible work rules concerning, among other things, the timing 
of breaks.  As of the early 1990s, however, strict work rules were still a prominent feature   61
of the Swedish construction industry, which has performed poorly in terms of 
productivity even compared to the long-term productivity decline of the U.S. construction 
industry.  Likewise, zoning laws restricting the size and expansion of retail outlets in 
Sweden are still present, although when some of these laws were relaxed in the early 
1990s the retail sector saw some productivity gains. 
 
  The OECD (2004d) discusses Sweden’s product market competition, enforcement 
of competition laws and other areas of domestic competitiveness from the perspective of 
the mobility of labour and capital and the fostering of entrepreneurship.  The OECD, like 
MGI, stresses the success of the deregulation of some sectors in terms of boosting 
productivity growth, but notes that more intense product market competition is integral in 
reinforcing these productivity gains.  But product market competition needs to be 
reinforced itself, since the benefits of competition will be minimal if the most competitive 
firms are not able to attract workers and investment in order to grow and further 
challenge their less successful competitors.  Unfortunately, very strict employment 
protection legislation, a virtually flat before and after tax earnings structure that is a 
remnant of the centralized collective bargaining of the past and that is also driven by the 
extensive income redistribution system, and non-uniform corporate tax rules all impede 
workers and capital from moving to firms and positions in which they could be more 
productive. 
 
  The relatively flat earnings structure also has implications for human capital 
development and the innovative behaviour of firms.  Morck (2001), in discussing the 
principle of rewarding innovative workers with higher pay in order to encourage further 
innovation, states that Sweden’s high marginal tax rates for high income earners have 
discouraged young Swedes from accumulating skills, and that Sweden is consequently 
experiencing a skills shortage and faltering productivity.  The OECD (2004d) does 
mention that the long period of time required for Swedes to complete tertiary education 
may have productivity consequences, but discusses this in the context of policies 
regarding application rules and study grants rather than as a consequence of the limited 
incentives to acquire higher education in the first place or to enter a high-paying job after 
graduation. 
 
  Finally, the OECD mentions that entrepreneurial activity may be weak in Sweden 
due to some competition-related factors.  Debt receives a much more favourable tax 
treatment in Sweden than equity, which makes raising venture capital difficult.  Also, the 
high level of employment protection enjoyed by workers likely discourages would-be 
entrepreneurs from making the transition to self-employment. 
 
2)  Industrial Structure 
 
  Given the asymmetry evident in Sweden’s economy – a few industries facing 
intense international competition and achieving rapid productivity growth versus a 
majority of the economy facing little competition and experiencing little change in 
productivity – the question of the industry sources of aggregate productivity growth is an 
important one.  If Sweden’s aggregate labour productivity growth relies on a few   62
industries, some major event negatively affecting these industries might have a massive 
impact on overall productivity and average living standards.  On the other hand, if the 
industries with rapid productivity growth make only a small contribution to overall 
productivity growth, the more diversified nature of productivity would provide a greater 
degree of economic security in the event of some negative shock. 
 
  Lind (2005) undertakes a shift-share analysis of productivity growth in Sweden’s 
manufacturing sector, and finds that the stellar performance of the 1990s was largely 
attributable to a single manufacturing industry, namely telecommunications.  This 
contribution includes both a large pure productivity effect and an even larger effect 
related to the reallocation of labour to this high productivity growth industry.  Much more 
moderate overall effects were noted for pulp and paper, machinery, chemicals, and motor 
vehicles, and smaller or negative effects from the 13 other manufacturing industries.  
Among these other industries, the reallocation effect tended to be negative, as more 
productive firms shed labour and vice versa. 
 
  Østbye and Westerlund (2004) also undertake productivity analysis at the industry 
level for Sweden, but they do so for all industries (rather than just manufacturing) and at 
the regional level.  They find that regions with lower overall labour productivity levels 
tended also to have lower productivity growth rates, or in other words, there was regional 
productivity divergence in Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s.  Further, they find that this 
divergence is strongly related to labour productivity developments at the sectoral level.  
Although the authors do not discuss the possibility (since they do not have data below the 
level of major sectors), this evidence would seem to support a hypothesis that it is only 
the regions in which the few well-performing sub-industries are located that have 
managed any sort of productivity success.  This underlines the point that, when aggregate 
productivity depends so strongly on a few small industries, the simple absence of these 
small industries can have large negative effects on productivity and hence living 
standards. 
 
3)  ICT and R&D 
 
  Dunnewijk (2003), like Lind (2005), undertakes a shift-share analysis of 
Sweden’s productivity, except that the analysis encompasses the total economy and 
focuses on industry aggregates based on ICT use and production.  Dunnewijk finds for 
both Sweden and Finland that the ICT-producing manufacturing aggregate made the 
largest contribution to aggregate labour productivity growth in the 1990s.  This is driven 
by Ericsson and Nokia respectively, and confirms the huge contribution made by the 
telecommunications manufacturing industry found by Lind (2005).  ICT-producing 
manufacturing industries and ICT-using service industries also made significant 
contributions to productivity growth in the European countries studied by Dunnewijk, 
although much more so in Ireland than in Sweden or Finland. 
 
  The relationship between ICT and labour productivity would therefore appear to 
be very similar in Sweden as in Finland – namely, that ICT production, dominated by a 
single firm, is much more important for aggregate productivity growth than ICT use, with   63
limited productivity and technological spill-overs to other firms and industries.  Saito 
(2001:Chart 21-1) illustrates this point, showing a strong correlation between economy-
wide multifactor productivity growth and the increase in the share of ICT industries in 
total GDP.  Most importantly, Sweden and Finland clearly resemble the United States 
much more than other European countries in terms of having experienced large increases 
in both of these variables in the 1990s.  The difference, of course, is that the performance 
in Sweden and Finland is driven by a single firm in each country, whereas the United 
States has a well-developed and diverse ICT-producing sector in addition to the extensive 
use of ICT. 
 
  In terms of spill-overs to other firms and industries, Ejermo (2004) finds that, 
despite being one of the most R&D intensive countries in the world, Sweden does not 
exhibit large R&D spill-overs.  While there are R&D spill-overs within the group of 
R&D performers, they are small relative to those that have been observed for other 
countries.  Furthermore, while there do appear to be some spill-overs from R&D 
performers to non-performers, these appear to be quite small (although the author 
predicts that they are not altogether insignificant in the aggregate).  Ejermo concludes 
that one possible explanation of the small R&D spill-overs in Sweden is that most R&D 
in Sweden is performed by large multinationals, which interact more with their 
international competitors than with smaller Swedish firms.  Indeed, Andersson (2002) 
suggests that it is not so much R&D intensity itself that improves productivity growth in 
Swedish manufacturing, but rather openness to trade, which gives better access to 
international technological spill-overs.  From this perspective, smaller Swedish firms 
would appear to be more likely to absorb the benefits of R&D performed internationally 
than those of R&D performed in Sweden. 
 
4)  Conclusion 
 
  While Sweden’s productivity performance in the 1980s and 1990s is interesting in 
its own right, the lessons to be drawn for other countries are not immediately obvious, 
given the relatively unique characteristics of Sweden such as a single dominant industry, 
a high degree of income redistribution and employment protection even by European 
standards, and the polarization of its economy into some highly competitive sectors and 
other heavily protected sectors.  Nonetheless, some general points can be made. 
 
•  A comprehensive approach to promoting competition – encompassing 
deregulation and product market competition, the free movement of labour and 
capital, openness to trade, among other factors – is necessary for maximizing the 
potential for productivity gains. 
 
•  The reliance on a single industry or even firm for aggregate productivity increases 
can subject a country to the greater possibility of suffering a prolonged stagnation 
in labour productivity and hence living standards.  Indeed, the present slowdown 
in the telecommunications industry internationally will probably mean that 
Sweden’s aggregate labour productivity growth will fall far below the impressive 
rate experienced in the 1990s.   64
 
•  As in Finland, the productivity-enhancing ICT revolution in Sweden is linked 
almost exclusively to ICT production rather than ICT use, and is dependent on a 
single firm.  It is therefore not yet possible to state that Sweden has entered a 
“new economy” phase of development, defined as an acceleration in labour 
productivity growth that is broadly based across industries.  This may in turn 
imply that the new economy-style productivity growth at the aggregate level 
experienced by Sweden in the 1990s may not be sustainable. 
 
•  In a small open economy such as Sweden or Finland, most technological spill-
overs occur across international boundaries, and there appears to be very limited 
scope for other industries and firms to benefit from the R&D and productivity 
performance of the national leaders.  This underlines the importance of openness 
for innovation and productivity growth. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion: Lessons for Canada  from International 
Productivity Experience 
 
  This report has analyzed productivity levels and trends in OECD countries; 
provided a brief overview of the most recent thinking on productivity drivers based on 
two major productivity analysis exercises, the OECD growth project and the McKinsey 
Global Institute productivity studies; and undertaken an examination of the productivity 
experience of six OECD countries – the United States, Ireland, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Finland, and Sweden. 
 
  A number of potential lessons for Canada emerge from the report. 
 
•  Competition and productivity are closely intertwined. Sectors that have been 
opened up to market forces, both domestic and international, have generally 
registered significant productivity gains, as seen most strikingly in the United 
Kingdom. The existence of a competitive environment is an essential condition 
for productivity advance. One of the most important steps, if not the most 
important step, that governments can take to promote productivity growth is to 
ensure that markets, whether it be product markets, labour markets, or capital 
markets, are as competitive as possible.  
 
•  Human capital is the foundation of productivity advance, driving innovation. 
Countries that have focused on human capital investment, particularly in the 
higher education area, have seen a major payoff in productivity growth. The basis 
of the U.S. productivity resurgence is that country’s world class system of 
research universities, which have created the knowledge that led to the emergence 
of productivity-enhancing ICT. Ireland’s productivity success is also closely 
linked to the massive expansion of opportunities for higher education in that 
country. Thus support of the higher education sector, including both research and   65
teaching, likely represents the most effective means by which government 
resources can be used to promote productivity growth.  
 
•  R&D intensity (R&D/GDP) is crucial for innovation and productivity growth, but 
it is not the complete story. The strong productivity performance of Sweden and 
Finland is closely related to the rapid growth in these countries of ICT-producing 
industries, in turn related to high R&D intensity. But the Swedish and Finnish 
experiences have shown that the presence of highly successful firms in certain 
high tech industries in a country does not automatically lead to the diffusion of 
productivity-enhancing ICT to the non-ICT producing sectors. Rather, it is the 
overall openness of these sectors to world technological developments that is 
crucial for their adoption of leading technologies. Since Canada through its R&D 
efforts accounts for a very small proportion of the world supply of innovations, 
the wide diffusion of best practice techniques in this country depends critically on 
the ability of Canadian firms to keep themselves abreast of world technological 
developments and to assimilate those developments.  As the Swedish and Finnish 
cases illustrate so well, R&D intensity in itself may be necessary for rapid 
productivity growth, but it is certainly not sufficient.  Sweden and Finland have 
the two highest R&D intensities, yet have labour productivity levels below the 
United States and at least eight other European countries. 
 
•  As a general rule, institutional rigidities impede productivity advance while 
institutional flexibility supports it. Many examples of this general principle came 
to light in the six country studies. For example, both Sweden and Finland have 
recognized that certain of the characteristics of their labour market institutions – 
such as centralized collective bargaining and limited earnings differentials 
between high and low skilled workers – can have negative implications for 
productivity growth. Both countries have shown flexibility in adapting their 
institutions to make them conducive to, or at least not inimical to, productivity 
advance.  
 
Based on the four key lessons for Canada that have emerged from this survey of 
the productivity experience of six counties, we could like to put forward a number of 
specific policies that could be usefully considered in the Canadian context. 
 
  In terms of the first lesson concerning the importance of market forces, some 
specific policies that could foster productivity growth in Canada follow. 
 
•  An enhanced competitive environment through deregulation. A step in this 
direction for the telecommunications industry was recently recommended in the 
recently released final report of the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel 
(2006). Such a move would foster faster adoption of information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) through greater ICT investment, an area 
where Canada significantly lags the United States (Sharpe, 2005). ICTs which 
have been identified as a key source of productivity growth and responsible for   66
the acceleration of productivity growth in both Canada and the United States in 
the second half of the 1990s.   
 
•  A gradual winding down of marketing boards which limit the supply of certain 
agricultural products such as milk. Such a measure would spur the entry of 
producers with innovative ideas and the exit of low productivity firms, thereby 
increasing productivity through a composition effect. As these industries affected 
by production restrictions are relatively small, this measure would likely not have 
a major impact on productivity. There would likely be strong opposition of such a 
move as the benefits of marketing boards are concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of producers, but the costs are borne by all the population through higher 
prices. The producers have much more incentive to organize against such a policy 
that the beneficiaries to organize in favour of it.  
 
  In terms of the second lesson, the federal government has recognized the 
importance of the importance of human capital for productivity growth. Since 1997, the 
federal government has taken a number of measures to boost post-secondary education, 
including the establishment of the Canada Research Chair program and additional 
funding for the granting councils. Two policies in the human capital area that could be 
pursued more vigorously are outlined below. 
 
•  A reduction in the underemployment of the human capital of recent immigrants to 
Canada through programs that better and more quickly foster the integration of 
immigrants into the workforce. Such programs would include language training, 
subsidies for employers to provide recent immigrants with Canadian work 
experience, and different types of integrative assistance (e.g. information on 
Canadian requirements in licensed occupations, individual counseling for the 
development of plans for recent immigrants to find appropriate employment, 
retraining programs to meet Canadian requirements, seminars on job search skills  
in the Canadian context, etc.)  to immigrants so that they can meet Canadian 
occupational requirements, both before and after arrival in Canada.  The boost to 
productivity growth from such measures is potentially huge. The skills of 
immigrants have already been acquired at no cost to Canadian taxpayers. With a 
small investment in workplace integration, the skills of these immigrants could 
become fully utilized and contribute significantly to the economy. 
 
•  A greater emphasis on the basic skills of the workforce. A characteristic of the 
workforce of a number of the countries studied in this report (e.g. Sweden, 
Finland, Ireland) was its high level of basic skills. Indeed, it has been shown that 
improvements in basic skills such as literacy and numeracy can significantly 
boost productivity growth (Coulombe, Tremblay, and Marchand, 2004). There is 
much room for Canada to improve the basic skills of its workforce. Policies in 
this area, such as basic literacy programs, would potentially have a large payoff 
(Fortin, 2005). One specific program is to extend Employment Insurance (EI) 
benefits to low skill workers who take education or training leaves as part of a 
formal training plan. (Jackson, 2005).   67
 
   The third lesson concerns the importance of the adoption of new technologies, as 
opposed to the production of new technologies through R&D. This lesson was in 
particular identified with Ireland, a country with a relatively low R&D intensity, yet very 
rapid productivity growth. Specific policies that could be considered in this area for 
Canada include the following. 
 
•  The expansion of programs that foster the adoption of best practice technologies 
and management practices by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by 
providing these firms with information on the latest technological developments 
in their industry and with technical advice on how to best adopt the latest 
technology in their situation. The Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) 
run by the National Research Council is an example of a program that has been  
recognized as effective in fostering the adoption of new technologies by SMEs. 
The expansion of IRAP and similar technology transfer programs would likely 
have a significant productivity payoff.   
 
•  As noted earlier, information and communications technologies are a key driver 
of productivity growth. Yet Canada badly lags the United States in ICT 
investment per worker across almost all industries. Measures to increase ICT 
investment thus could boost productivity growth. One such measure is the ICT tax 
credit recently proposed by the Telecommunications Policy Review Panel (2006). 
This measure would be targeted at SMEs and would apply on an incremental 
basis to all expenditures on ICT capital goods as well as complementary 
investments in training and reengineering needed for effective ICT adoption. A 
second measure is the harmonization of provincial sales tax systems with the 
GST. The PST in certain provinces (Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island) is applied to ICT spending, increasing 
its cost compared to other more long-lived asset types, and discouraging ICT 
investment. Harmonization with the GST (under which ICT investment is not 
taxed) would  reduce this current bias of the tax system against ICT investment. 
 
 
  The fourth lesson concerns the role of institutional rigidities in impeding 
productivity growth and the identification of these rigidities and their removal. Specific 
rigidities in Canada include the following. 
 
•  The Employment Insurance (EI) program, which provides income support  for the 
unemployed in seasonal occupations, discourages to some degree mobility to 
regions where permanent employment prospects are more promising. Given the 
current high levels of interprovincial mobility in this country from high 
unemployment to low unemployment regions (the population of Newfoundland 
fell from 580 thousand in 1992 to 520 thousand in 2003, with many of the out-
migrants going to Alberta), it is important not to overemphasize the importance of 
this rigidity to mobility (Sharpe and Smith, 2005). Nevertheless, during this time 
of very low national unemployment, from a national perspective there is no better   68
occasion to encourage the unemployed to leave high unemployment areas to seek 
work through a shift from passive income support role of EI to a more active role 
for EI that attempts to integrate the unemployed into jobs through by fostering 
mobility and retraining.  
 
•  Reduction in interprovincial barriers to labour mobility in the professions and the 
trades to allow a greater role for market forces to influence the reallocation of 
workers from low productivity/low wage to high productivity/high wage jobs, a 
an important source of productivity growth. Jurisdiction over occupational 
certification resides with the provincial level of government. It is essential that the 
federal government work with the provinces to develop certification programs 
that are recognized in all provinces. The Red Seal program for the apprenticeable 
trades is an excellent example of a program that promotes mobility throughout the 
country. This program, and similar programs for other occupations, should be 
expanded.   
 
It is always difficult to gauge the relative payoffs to different economic policies. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the four key productivity drivers (human capital, 
competition, R&D and institutional flexibility) discussed, a case can be made that the 
payoff from additional investment in the area of skills development would be greater than 
that of additional investment in R&D. This is in part because Canada already has one of 
the most generous fiscal regimes for R&D in the world. In contrast, our investment in 
skills development by both the public and private sectors is relatively weak by 
international standards. From this perspective, a skills development strategy should play a 
salient role Canada’s overall productivity strategy.  
 
  This report has surveyed the international productivity experience of six industrial 
countries and drawn out lessons for Canada. While there is much to learn from 
international experience, it is important to recognize that policies that work in one 
country flow from the particular context or situation of that countries and are likely not 
transferable holus bolus to another country. Policies to improve productivity growth in 
Canada, while informed by the experience of other countries, must be based on the 
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Appendix 1  
 




Measurements of such macro-economic variables as employment, hours worked 
and GDP need to be based on conventions, which have limitations since the conventions 
may change over time or vary from one country to the next. This means that statistics 
may be not completely comparable across countries. Recent discussions on international 
comparisons of per capita GDP testify to their fragility and prompt us to consider only 
sizable differences as robust. What follows are some illustrations of problems involved in 
measuring GDP and employment.  
 
Three examples of GDP measurement elements that are likely to introduce bias 
into international comparisons can be cited: 
 
•  The conversion of GDP into a common monetary unit for the purposes of 
international comparisons may be based on several different conventions. Thus, 
differences in the conversion conventions can change the per capita GDP rankings 
of countries where the figures are close. This means that rankings of countries 
based on the level of a per capita GDP indicator should only consider large 
differences as significant and rankings should not be established for countries 
where the indicator levels are close. 
 
•  Different statistical methodologies may be used to adjust prices for in changes in 
quality. Some countries such as the United States have been very aggressive in the 
use of hedonics to capture quality improvements in computers, while others have 
been more conservative.   
 
•  Some national accounts conventions may vary from one country to the next, 
which can lead to bias in productivity or per capita GDP comparisons. The 
biggest differences are between European and U.S. conventions. The latter tend to 
result in higher GDP and GDP growth than the former. Three illustrations of such 
differences can be cited. All three deal with the issue of  the apportioning of 
consumption between final consumption and intermediate consumption:  
 
(i)  the FISIM (financial intermediation services indirectly measured) 
item is  treated as intermediate consumption exclusively in Europe, 
whereas some of it is  counted as household consumption in 
America and thus included in America’s   value added and GDP. 
This difference in conventions appears to increase the United 
States GDP by 2-3 per cent relative to Europe; 
                                                  
26 This appendix is drawn from Cette (2005)   79
  
(ii)  spending on military equipment is treated as government 
intermediate consumption in Europe, whereas the United States 




(iii)  the division of business expenditure on software into intermediate 
consumption and investment favours investment in the United 
States, thereby increasing its GDP accordingly, compared to 
European countries. The latter difference in conventions appears to 
increase the United States’ GDP by about 0.8 per cent compared to 
France.  
 
The combined effect of these three differences in accounting conventions appears 
to ‘inflate’ American GDP 2-5 per cent compared to European standards.  
 
  Measurements of employment and hours worked can also be complicated by the 
lack of standard conventions and changes in conventions. We can cite three examples of 
such difficulties:  
 
•  aggregate employment includes self-employed and unpaid workers and the 
proportion of such workers varies over time and from one country to the next. 
Measuring hours worked for this population is very problematic. This is 
particularly true of the unpaid family workers included in this population. Unpaid 
family workers accounted for 4.4 per cent of aggregate employment in France in 
1980, versus 0.8 per cent in the United States and 10.9 per cent in Japan. The 
figures for 2002 were 1.7 per cent, 0.1 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively ; 
  
•  in some countries, the measurement of working hours changed over the period. 
For example, in France, when the statutory work week was reduced to 35 hours, 
the definition of hours worked was changed, which may have affected the 
measurement of hours worked collected from business surveys; 
 
•  also in France, the introduction of tax deductions for households’ expenditure on 
domestic help also led to the legitimization of many previously undeclared jobs. 
National accountants try to account for undeclared work in the GDP estimates, 
but not in the measurement of employment. Thus, the legitimization of some 
previously undeclared jobs could lead to a reduction in apparent labour 
productivity, all else being equal. Some of the decrease in labour productivity 
seen in Spain in the mid-1990s was probably due to a bias of this type. 
 
We should also point out that productivity comparisons between industries are 
even more complicated. Two examples can be cited to support this:  
   80
•  agency temps are counted as business service workers, even though about half of 
them work in the manufacturing industry in France. This distorts productivity 
estimates when output is measured in terms of production. It also distorts 
productivity estimates when output is measured in terms of value added, because 
the structure of temporary jobs by skills requirements is very different from the 
overall structure of jobs in the industries relying heavily on agency temps. This 
problem is especially acute in France because the use of agency temps is much 
more common than it is in other industrialised countries; 
 
•  in some industries, the division of output into volumes and prices can be very 
difficult if these characteristics are subject to rapid change. This is particularly the 
case in the information and communications technology industries, where the case 
of mobile telephony services provides a stark illustration.  
 
The review of these measurement problems indicates that one must be very 
careful when making international comparisons and only large differences should be 
considered as robust. 
 
 